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It remains a mystery to me how [the lockstep] principle ever came into
being, and why once in existence, it has remained embedded,
seemingly indelible, in the body of our law.1
– Former Illinois Supreme Court Justice William G. Clark

INTRODUCTION
Over the past several decades, the legal community has witnessed
state courts increasingly rely upon their state constitutions as
independent sources of individual rights.2 This phenomenon, called
“judicial federalism” or the “new judicial federalism,” has resulted in
many states extending greater protections to individual liberties under
their respective state constitutions than are recognized under the Federal
Constitution.3 Other state courts largely reject the call for judicial
federalism and instead engage in a “lockstep” analysis that requires
judges to interpret their state constitutions dependently on the United
States Supreme Court’s interpretation of analogous federal provisions.
Illinois rulings have generally fallen into the latter category. Indeed,
in a majority of cases involving article I of the Illinois Constitution of
1970 (the Illinois Bill of Rights),4 our state’s high court has followed
the lockstep approach. The most recent significant case from the
Illinois Supreme Court is People v. Caballes, where the court sought to
1. People ex rel. Daley v. Joyce, 533 N.E.2d 873, 879 (Ill. 1988) (Clark, J., concurring).
2. Mary Cornelia Porter & G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial Federalism and the Ohio Supreme
Court: The Anatomy of a Failure, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 143, 143 (1984) (citing G. Alan Tarr,
Bibliographic Essay, in STATE SUPREME COURTS 203, 206–08 (1982), and Developments in the
Law—The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1328–30
(1982)).
3. Id. at 143.
4. All references herein to the “Illinois Constitution” pertain to the Illinois Constitution of
1970 unless otherwise stated.
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reconcile prior rulings and formally adopted a “limited lockstep”
approach.5 However, few things in Illinois are ever simple. One could
certainly argue that the Illinois Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on this
issue is fraught with inconsistency.6 Perhaps the most evident lesson
offered by the case law is that members of the court have expressed
passionately divergent views about whether the Illinois Constitution
should be interpreted dependent on, or independent of, the United States
Constitution. The discourse among Illinois Supreme Court justices
regarding this “dependent-independent” debate has been turbulent and
sometimes even testy.
This Article seeks to shed light on the mystery of the lockstep
approach’s application in Illinois, as Justice Clark alluded to in People
ex rel. Daley v. Joyce.7 Part I evaluates judicial federalism’s national
evolution and the arguments on both sides of the debate. Next, Part II
examines the factors that may have influenced some state courts, and in
particular the Illinois Supreme Court, to adopt a predominately lockstep
approach. Part II also reviews the most significant Illinois Supreme
Court rulings on this issue. Finally, Part III discusses the impact of the
seminal Caballes case on the lockstep approach, as well as the future of
the lockstep doctrine in Illinois.
I. THE JUDICIAL FEDERALISM DEBATE
A. Evolution of Judicial Federalism in the United States
Many observers believe that judicial federalism emerged in the early
1970s when Justice Earl Warren departed from the United States
Supreme Court.8 These commentators argue that, while the Warren
5. People v. Caballes, 851 N.E.2d 26, 42 (Ill. 2006). Under the limited lockstep approach,
Illinois courts may apply an independent analysis when “a specific criterion—for example,
unique state history or state experience—justifies departure from federal precedent.” Id. at 43
(internal quotation marks and citation excluded). Additional criteria used by the court to justify
an independent analysis include situations involving the state’s values, traditions, pre-existing
law, specific language in the state constitution, or statements from the constitutional convention
committee reports. See, e.g., id. at 42–43.
6. See id. at 57 (Freeman, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that confusion has “animated our
application of the ‘lockstep doctrine’”).
7. People ex rel. Daley v. Joyce, 533 N.E.2d 873, 879 (Ill. 1988) (Clark, J., concurring).
8. See, e.g., Paul H. Anderson & Julie A. Oseid, A Decision Tree Takes Root in the Land of
10,000 Lakes: Minnesota’s Approach to Protecting Individual Rights under Both the United
States and Minnesota Constitutions, 70 ALB. L. REV. 865, 877 (2007) (“A renaissance of judicial
federalism began in the 1970s. Some commentators have indicated that this renaissance started as
the result of a perceived retrenchment by the U.S. Supreme Court on individual rights during the
Warren E. Burger era (1969–86), which followed the more progressive Earl Warren era (1953–
69). During this period of retrenchment, some state courts looked to their own constitutions to
either maintain or provide greater protection for individual rights.” (citations omitted)). See also
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Court (1953–1969) issued numerous groundbreaking decisions
expanding individuals’ constitutional rights, the Burger Court (1969–
1986) subsequently eroded those rights.9 Justice William Brennan, an
early pioneer of state constitutionalism, feared that an “increasingly
conservative federal judiciary would decline to protect liberty as
vigorously as in the past.”10 He encouraged state courts to respond to
the Burger Court’s reach by looking to their own constitutions for
protection.11 Justice Brennan further declared that the “[r]ediscovery by
state supreme courts of the broader protections afforded their own
citizens by their state constitutions . . . is probably the most important
development in constitutional jurisprudence in our time.”12
Eventually, judicial federalism spread, and many state supreme courts
began basing rulings on their own constitutions despite the existence of
alternative authority in the Federal Constitution.13 In 1986, two
researchers discovered only ten cases decided between 1950 and 1969
in which state judges relied on state grounds to provide greater
protection than those afforded by the Federal Constitution.14 Between
1970 and 1986, the number of such cases skyrocketed to 300.15
Despite an increase in state constitutionalism, other research suggests
that this growing trend has not yet displaced state courts’ general
preference to base individual rights rulings predominately on federal
grounds. For example, one study indicated that in 78% of the cases
examined, state courts relied entirely on federal grounds to rule on selfincrimination cases, despite the existence of self-incrimination

Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutional Theory and Its Prospects, 28 N.M. L. REV. 271, 271
(1998) (discussing Justice Brennan’s “strategic effort . . . to highlight the value of plumbing the
states for individual rights protections in the face of conservative retrenchment”); Robert A.
Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 84 VA. L. REV. 389, 420 (1998)
(“The renewed interest in state constitutions was prompted by the desire to entrench and advance
the accomplishments of the Warren Court at a time when the federal judiciary was becoming
hostile to the expansion of certain claims of individual rights.”).
9. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
10. Suzanna Sherry, Foreword: State Constitutional Law: Doing the Right Thing, 25
RUTGERS L.J. 935, 935 (1994).
11. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The
Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 548
(1986).
12. NAT’L L.J., Sept. 29, 1986, at S1 (quoting Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.).
13. G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial Federalism in Perspective, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1097, 1098 (1997).
14. Ronald K. L. Collins & Peter J. Galie, Models of Post-Incorporation Judicial Review:
1985 Survey of State Constitutional Individual Rights Decisions, 16 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM
111, 111 (1986).
15. Id. State courts decided most of the cases from 1977 onward. Id.
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protection in nearly every state constitution.16 Only eight state supreme
courts relied upon state grounds in more than 50% of such cases.17
Thus, even though the judicial federalism movement has become an
emerging force in American jurisprudence, it may be too early to
identify the scope and scale of its impact on states’ rights and
constitutional discourse.
B. The Arguments in the Dependent-Independent Debate
Proponents of judicial federalism contend that independent
interpretation of state constitutions provides a valuable source of rights
and liberties.18 They further argue that “constitutional interpretation is
far from a science and certainly does not have a single correct answer”;
and given that United States Supreme Court Justices routinely disagree,
the Court itself shifts over time despite a stated preference for stare
decisis.19 Some advocates assert a “states as laboratories” theory,
whereby “states can be innovative in their constitutional interpretation
without burdening the rest of the country.”20 One commentator notes
that federal courts are restrained in matters of constitutional
interpretation because the Supreme Court must formulate uniform
national standards of conduct.21 Moreover, reliance on state grounds
can shield state court rulings from federal review.22 As discussed
below, some members of the Illinois Supreme Court have presented
additional arguments in favor of a federalist approach that were, at
times, blistering.
Judicial federalism is not, however, free from criticism. Opponents
claim that: (1) reliance upon state law is generally result-oriented and
usurps executive and legislative power; (2) reliance on state
16. Michael Esler, State Supreme Court Commitment to State Law, 78 JUDICATURE 25, 28
(1994).
17. Id. at 29.
18. Jeff Hicks, Note, The Effler Shot across the Bow: Developing a Novel State Constitutional
Claim under the Threat of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 931, 945–
46 (2011).
19. Id. See also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911–12 (2010)
(stating that stare decisis is a principle of policy and that “precedent is to be respected,” but also
identifying considerations that justify departure from stare decisis); O’Casek v. Children’s Home
& Aid Soc’y of Ill., 892 N.E.2d 994, 1006–07 (Ill. 2008) (discussing principles of vertical and
horizontal stare decisis and the bases for following or departing from same).
20. Hicks, supra note 18, at 946.
21. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Unenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1226–27 (1978).
22. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) (stating that the United States
Supreme Court will not disturb a ruling that is based solely on independent state grounds).
However, it is incumbent on the state court to clearly identify its ruling as one that rests on sole or
independent state grounds. Id. at 1038–43.
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constitutional law is improper because it shields those constitutional
claims from federal review; (3) most decisions protecting individuals’
rights cannot be reconciled with historical intent; and (4) absent clear
historical or textual support, state law decisions deviating from federal
case law are either illegitimate per se or illegitimate to the extent that
they are not the result of “neutral criteria” stemming from historical and
textual considerations.23
The arguments against judicial federalism rely, in turn, on several
premises: (1) federal case law is the most appropriate analytical
yardstick to measure the legitimacy of state constitutional case law; (2)
the United States Supreme Court bears the ultimate constitutional
responsibility to determine individuals’ rights; (3) state courts should
assign paramount jurisprudential weight to historical intent; (4) state
constitutional provisions analogous to federal provisions are
functionally irrelevant; (5) no essential differences exist between the
various models or theories of new judicial federalism; and (6) federal
supremacy and minimum standards notwithstanding, uniformity is more
essential to constitutional jurisprudence than to other legal areas.24
Professor James Gardner of SUNY-Buffalo Law School is one of the
most vocal critics of state constitutionalism. In 1992, he published an
article contending that state constitutional law is a “vast wasteland of
confusing,
conflicting,
and
essentially
unintelligible
pronouncements.”25 He further asserted that responsibility for this
problem rests at the feet of state courts’ failure to “develop a coherent
discourse of state constitutional law,” and ultimately a failure of state
constitutionalism itself based on several factors.26 Gardner’s seminal
article has been called provocative27 and “controversial but
influential.”28 Over 300 law reviews have cited his article, several of
which express a contrary viewpoint.29 The Illinois Supreme Court even
23. Ronald K.L. Collins, Foreword: The Once “New Judicial Federalism” and Its Critics, 64
WASH. L. REV. 5, 6 (1989).
24. Id.
25. James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV.
761, 763 (1992).
26. Id. at 763–64. See also infra Part II.A (providing further details about these factors).
27. Robert F. Williams, Introduction, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 908 (1993).
28. Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV.
323, 362 (2011).
29. See, e.g., Rex Armstrong, State Court Federalism, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 493 (1996)
(expounding that Gardner’s theory is contrary to the nature of federalism and detrimental to the
benefits of diverse development of law, and that state constitutions can be relied upon in
meaningful ways without disregarding the importance of the Federal Constitution); Hans A.
Linde, State Constitutions Are Not Common Law: Comments on Gardner’s Failed Discourse, 24
RUTGERS L.J. 927 (1993) (asserting that Gardner’s article is overly theoretical and does not
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referenced Professor Gardner’s article in its landmark lockstep ruling,
People v. Caballes.30
II. ANALYZING THE LOCKSTEP DOCTRINE IN ILLINOIS JURISPRUDENCE
This Part contains three Sections and focuses on why courts—and in
particular Illinois courts—have ruled the way they have when it comes
to state constitutional interpretation. Section A reviews Professor
Gardner’s attempts to identify and discuss factors that may lead certain
states toward a more robust state constitutional discourse than other
states. Section B details a five-year analysis of Illinois Supreme Court
cases, from 2006 through 2010, that tests Gardner’s theories and
considers whether Illinois jurisprudence supports his hypotheses and
observations. Section C discusses theories on why the Illinois Supreme
Court has decided to generally reject the judicial federalist approach and
includes three Subparts: (1) a review of the prevailing political and legal
theories behind the judicial decision-making process, and discussion
regarding how these theories may, if at all, help explain the court’s
limited lockstep approach; (2) consideration of other factors external to
the court that may impact its rulings; and (3) an analysis of the court’s
major rulings and individual statements by justices who have been
particularly outspoken on whether the Illinois Constitution should be
subject to a dependent or independent interpretation.
A. Gardner’s Hypothesized Influences over a State Court’s Decision to
Accept or Reject Judicial Federalism
Professor Gardner’s influential 1992 article included an effort to
identify factors that may lead a state supreme court to develop its own
robust constitutional discourse.31 Gardner chose a sample consisting of
seven states: New York, Massachusetts, Virginia, Louisiana, California,
Kansas, and New Hampshire.32 He also limited his research to those
rulings setting forth a substantive analysis (rather than mere cursory
discussion) from the highest courts of these states.33 Finally, he
reviewed only cases decided in 1990, giving him a sample size of 1208
address the practical day-to-day implications of new federalism); David Schuman, A Failed
Critique of State Constitutionalism, 91 MICH. L. REV. 274 (1992) (arguing that although some
state constitutional jurisprudence has been poorly conceived, Oregon offers an example of
individual protections based on consistent and intelligible interpretation of a state constitution
grounded in the particular history of the state and text).
30. People v. Caballes, 851 N.E.2d 26, 41 (Ill. 2006) (referencing Gardner’s argument that the
lockstep approach reduces state constitutional language “to a redundancy”).
31. See Gardner, supra note 25, at 779–80.
32. Id. at 779.
33. Id.
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cases.34
Gardner hypothesized that five factors may influence a state court’s
ruling in the dependent-independent debate: (1) the state’s size; (2) its
age; (3) the existence of an unusual founding history; (4) the continuity
of its constitutional traditions; and (5) the nature of its constitutional
text.35 For example, Gardner hypothesized that a state’s size is
important due to the sheer number of cases litigated.36 That is, he
believed that a large state handling numerous constitutional cases would
likely develop an independent body of constitutional law.37 Similarly,
he deemed a state’s age important because older states have had
sufficient time to develop their constitutional jurisprudence.38 Gardner
also felt that a state’s unique founding history would be relevant
because such uniqueness might be reflected in its constitution, thereby
providing the state’s courts an opportunity to develop independent
constitutional doctrine.39 He deemed the continuity of a state’s
constitutional traditions important because a constitution with a lengthy
history is likely to be construed more often than a newer constitution;
and a history of repeated constitutional amendments could indicate a
unique attitude toward state constitutional doctrine.40 Finally, Gardner
opined that the length of the constitutional text might be conducive to
independent interpretation.41
Gardner’s study produced several general findings. First, the sample
states’ high courts ruled on state constitutional issues infrequently,
totaling only about 20% of their cases.42 Second, the sample results
demonstrated a general unwillingness among state supreme courts to
engage in any significant analysis of their respective constitutions.43
Third, the courts addressing constitutional issues often failed to specify
whether they based their decisions on the federal or state constitution.44
Fourth, states specifically interpreting their constitutions often used a
lockstep approach.45 Fifth, state courts rarely examine their state’s

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 779–80.
Id. at 779 n.64.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 780.
Id. at 781.
Id. at 785.
Id. at 788.
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constitutional history when analyzing state constitutional claims.46
Overall, Gardner concluded that “the overwhelming impression left
by an examination of state constitutional decisions is that state courts by
and large have little interest in creating the kind of state constitutional
discourse necessary to build an independent body of state constitutional
law.”47
Gardner’s conclusions regarding a general reluctance to reach state
constitutional issues are supported by other empirical research. For
example, a 1991 study by Professor Barry Latzer confirmed state
courts’ tendency to interpret their constitutions in lockstep with the
Federal Constitution.48 Latzer reviewed all state supreme court rulings
between 1960 and 1989 that decided criminal procedure issues on state
constitutional grounds. Latzer found that state courts routinely rely
upon United States Supreme Court analysis when interpreting
analogous provisions of their own constitutions.49 Other commentators
have similarly noted state courts’ historic preference to interpret their
constitutions in lockstep with federal precedent.50

46. Id. at 793.
47. Id. at 804. Gardner continues:
With a handful of exceptions, the decisions fail to address state constitutional issues
squarely and independently from federal constitutional jurisprudence, and show no
sign of any discourse of distinctness that would allow participants in the legal system
to craft intelligible arguments about the nature of any differences between the state and
federal constitutions.
By engaging in extensive lockstep analysis, many courts have also created an
atmosphere in which it is unnecessary to distinguish between the state and federal
constitutions because they are generally held to have the same meaning. This reduces
state constitutional law to a redundancy and greatly discourages its use and
development. . . .
Furthermore, the lesson of Michigan v. Long seems not to have penetrated the
jurisprudence of any state other than New Hampshire. By failing to specify when
holdings rest on state constitutional grounds and by borrowing extensively from federal
case law when construing their state constitutions, state courts not only confuse
participants in the state legal system but also leave themselves highly vulnerable to
Supreme Court review of decisions that may rest on adequate and independent state
grounds.
Id. at 804–05.
48. BARRY LATZER, STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 160–61 (1991).
49. Id. State courts relied on United States Supreme Court doctrine in over two-thirds of such
cases. Id.
50. See, e.g., Sue Davis & Tanya Lovell Banks, State Constitutions, Freedom of Expression,
and Search and Seizure: Prospects for State Court Reincarnation, 17 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM
13, 13 (1987); Todd F. Simon, Independent but Inadequate: State Constitutions and Protection of
Freedom of Expression, 33 U. KAN. L. REV. 305 (1985).
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B. Does Illinois Jurisprudence Support Gardner’s
Hypotheses and Observations?
This Section replicates Gardner’s study, but focuses on the Illinois
Supreme Court’s state constitutional jurisprudence from 2006 through
2010.51 Returning to Gardner’s five hypothesized factors that could
impact whether a state takes a lockstep or federalism approach,52 it is
difficult to conclude that Illinois—which generally adopts a lockstep
analysis—supports Gardner’s hypothesis. The first two factors can be
dealt with fairly easily. First, Gardner hypothesized that a large state is
more likely to have its own body of constitutional law. By most
relevant measures, Illinois is a large state—it is ranked fifth nationally
in population, twelfth in population density, and fifth in gross domestic
product.53 Illinois is also home to Cook County, which is one of the
busiest state trial court systems in the country. Second, Gardner
theorized that older states have had sufficient time to develop a state
constitutional discourse. He also pointed to two other factors, namely
the state’s founding history and the continuity of its state constitutional
traditions. Here, the analysis gets dicey. Illinois became the twentyfirst state in 1818, making it among the older states. However, the
current Illinois Constitution was adopted in 1970, with prior
constitutions having been adopted in 1870, 1848, and 1818. Some
provisions of article I are completely new, but a significant portion of
the Illinois Bill of Rights as contained in article I is substantively
carried over from earlier Illinois constitutions.54 Moreover, some have
argued that Illinois’s original Bill of Rights was based on the Virginia
Bill of Rights and the Northwest Ordinance, and not just the federal Bill
of Rights.55 In any event, it is fair to say that Illinois’s passage of four
state constitutions, influenced from sources not limited to the Federal
Constitution, demonstrates its robust history of state constitutional
discourse at the political level, if not the judicial level. Finally, Gardner
opined that the length of the state constitutional text might facilitate the
independent development of state constitutional jurisprudence. There is
nothing particularly unusual about the Illinois Constitution’s text. It is
51. Gardner’s findings are set forth above. See supra notes 42–47 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 35–40 and accompanying text.
53. Resident Population Density: Population Density, 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://
www.census.gov/2010census/data/apportionment-dens-text.php (last visited Feb. 15, 2013); Top
10 State GDPs in the United States, ECONPOST (Feb. 4, 2011), http://econpost.com/unitedstates
economy/largest-state-gdps-united-states (explaining gross domestic product).
54. See generally ANN M. LOUSIN, THE ILLINOIS STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE
GUIDE 39–70 (2010) (discussing the Illinois Bill of Rights).
55. Thomas B. McAffee, The Illinois Bill of Rights and Our Independent Legal Tradition: A
Critique of the Illinois Lockstep Doctrine, 12 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 20 (1987).
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not peculiar or unduly lengthy. Based on the foregoing, it appears that
Illinois falls into a category of states that Gardner deemed more likely
to take a judicial federalist approach. Yet, the Illinois Supreme Court’s
preference for a predominately lockstep analysis seems contrary to
Gardner’s hypothesis.
Beyond his hypotheses, Gardner also made several observations: (1)
state courts rarely reach state constitutional decisions, with decisions
comprising 7% to 31% of the cases decided; (2) a lack of substantive
analysis or discussion in state constitutional cases; (3) a failure to
identify or distinguish between state and federal constitutional analyses;
(4) a preference for lockstep analysis; and (5) an absence of discussion
regarding state constitutional history.56
Illinois Supreme Court
jurisprudence is consistent with some, but not all, of Gardner’s
observations.
First, Illinois is consistent with Gardner’s findings insofar as the
percentage of cases resolving state constitutional questions is fairly low.
Between 2006 and 2010, the Illinois Supreme Court substantively ruled
on just over 500 cases57 and referenced a “constitution” in only 275 of
such cases (equal to 55% of the time).58 However, the court referenced
the Illinois Constitution of 1970 in approximately 120 cases, leaving
155 cases that focused entirely on the Federal Constitution or made
merely passing references to the Illinois counterpart. Of the 120 cases
involving a state constitutional issue, around two-thirds involved claims
arising under article I’s Bill of Rights.
Second, like Gardner’s findings, a review of the case law from 2006
through 2010 demonstrates there is generally a lack of discrete analysis
or discussion of state constitutional issues. This is not always the case,
however, as the court has in numerous instances engaged in a thoughtful
and analytical discussion of state constitutional claims involving
individual rights.59 But this is not the norm, nor should it be since
Illinois is generally a lockstep state and its courts have been expressly
directed to “‘look first to the federal constitution, and only if federal law
provides no relief turn to the state constitution to determine whether a
56. Gardner, supra note 25, at 780–94.
57. This excludes non-substantive rulings, such as supervisory orders, attorney disciplinary
cases, and rulings on petitions for leave to appeal.
58. Gardner did not state whether he expressly limited his inquiry to state constitutional
decisions on individual rights cases, and so this analysis is similarly not limited. See Gardner,
supra note 25, at 779–80. Further, it is admittedly problematic to identify those instances where a
court addresses a “constitutional issue.” Cases range from those including meaningful discussion
of a disputed constitutional question, to the passing reference of the constitution as a source of
authority or other basic point of law.
59. See infra Part III.B.1–8.
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specific criterion . . . justifies departure from federal precedent.’”60
Third, Gardner’s sample of state court rulings often failed to identify
or distinguish between state and federal constitutional analyses. This is
often true in Illinois as well. Between 2006 and 2010, the Illinois
Supreme Court analyzed the interplay between the Illinois and Federal
Bill of Rights in approximately 3% of the 500 cases it decided.61 In
several of those cases, however, the court merely acknowledged that a
litigant failed to adequately raise the issue, and then proceeded to
analyze the issue solely on federal grounds.62 Illinois case law supports
Gardner’s conclusion that state courts often do not frame their rulings as

60. People v. Caballes, 851 N.E.2d 26, 42–43 (Ill. 2006) (quoting Lawrence Friedman, The
Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
93, 104 (2000)).
61. See, e.g., People v. Boeckmann, 932 N.E.2d 998, 1007 (Ill. 2010) (“The proportionate
penalties clause in [article I, section 11] [of] the Illinois Constitution is coextensive with the
federal constitution’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.” (citation omitted)); People ex
rel. Birkett v. Dockery, 919 N.E.2d 311, 314 (Ill. 2009) (recognizing that Illinois provides
broader protections to the right to a jury trial than are afforded by the Federal Constitution);
Pooh-Bah Enters., Inc. v. Cnty. of Cook, 905 N.E.2d 781, 805 (Ill. 2009) (refusing to extend the
reach of article I, section 4 of the Illinois Constitution beyond the boundaries of the First
Amendment); People v. Bailey, 903 N.E.2d 409, 418 (Ill. 2009) (refusing to find a violation of
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or article I, section 6 of the Illinois
Constitution); In re Lakisha M., 882 N.E.2d 570, 581 (Ill. 2008) (finding that a buccal swab given
by law enforcement officials, along with a lowered privacy expectation as a consequence of a
delinquency finding, violated neither state privacy nor state and federal search and seizure
protections); People v. Colon, 866 N.E.2d 207, 224 (Ill. 2007) (refusing to extend the state’s
protection against double jeopardy beyond that afforded under the Federal Constitution, and
overruling People v. Grayson, 319 N.E.2d 43 (Ill. 1974)); In re Rodney H., 861 N.E.2d 623, 628
(Ill. 2006) (stating that the proportionate penalties clause in article I, section 11 is coextensive
with the cruel and unusual punishment provisions of the Federal Constitution).
62. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. ProLogis, 923 N.E.2d 285, 291 (Ill. 2010) (refusing to
consider bondholders’ claim that the “Illinois takings clause provides them greater protection than
the federal takings clause provides” on the basis that litigants failed to raise this argument in their
petition for leave to appeal); In re Marriage of Miller, 879 N.E.2d 292, 296–99 (Ill. 2007) (noting
that although the litigant raised a violation of due process under the Illinois and Federal
Constitutions, he presented no argument that state due process afforded him greater rights; and
further noting that because the appellate court did not distinguish these two sources of rights in its
ruling, it would treated the two clauses coextensively and governed by federal case law); People
v. Molnar, 857 N.E.2d 209, 218 (Ill. 2006) (“[N]either party has argued that the state due process
clause provides greater protection than that provided by the federal constitution” and “we find no
compelling reason to do so in this case”); People v. Sutherland, 860 N.E.2d 178, 209–10 (Ill.
2006) (acknowledging that although defendant invoked protections under both state and federal
search and seizure clauses, he did not argue that the state constitution provided broader
protection); People v. Driggers, 853 N.E.2d 414, 417 (Ill. 2006) (noting that the defendant based
his search and seizure arguments solely on the Fourth Amendment and not on the Illinois
Constitution); People v. Garvin, 847 N.E.2d 82, 89 (Ill. 2006) (stating that the defendant based
his challenge on both state and federal search and seizure clauses but failed to “offer any
arguments specifically addressing the unique aspects of our state constitutional privacy
provisions, and therefore we do not consider those elements in our analysis”).

2_ANDERSON.DOCX

2013]

4/29/2013 9:29 AM

Judicial Federalism in Illinois

977

resting solely on state law.63 Indeed, the Illinois Supreme Court does
not appear to be particularly interested in shielding its rulings from
federal review. Under Michigan v. Long, a state court “can insulate its
decision from Supreme Court review by stating ‘clearly and expressly
that it is alternatively based on bona fide, separate, adequate, and
independent [state] grounds.’”64 The Illinois Supreme Court has cited
Michigan v. Long for this proposition only a handful of times, and
almost never to clearly delineate a ruling as resting solely on state
grounds.65 Former Illinois Supreme Court Justice James Heiple
expressed his dismay regarding the absence of a Michigan v. Long
statement in People v. Brownlee,66 stating:
In failing to declare explicitly that the Illinois Constitution
constitutes an independent ground for its decision, the court’s opinion
places the rights of Illinois citizens in the hands of the federal
judiciary. If an independent state law basis is not clearly apparent
from a state court’s opinion, the United States Supreme Court will
treat the decision as if based solely on federal law. The Supreme
Court is therefore free to reverse this court’s judgment if it disagrees
with our view of the protections which should be afforded to criminal
defendants, in this as well as in other cases.
The responsible approach in this and other similar cases is to
preclude federal review of the issue in question by clearly basing our
holding on the Illinois Constitution. If this court truly believes that the
right announced today is an essential component of the protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures, we should take the simple
steps necessary to prevent its possible curtailment by the United States
Supreme Court. By failing to be specific, this court has neglected an
important “opportunity to develop state jurisprudence unimpeded by
federal interference.”67

The absence of Michigan v. Long statements in Illinois Supreme Court
rulings suggests that the court is not only willing to give deference to
the United States Supreme Court on bill of rights matters, but is also
willing to be reversed on such issues if the federal high court deems it
appropriate.
Fourth, Illinois is consistent with Gardner’s analysis of his sample
states’ preferences for a lockstep approach pursuant to Caballes. As

63. See Gardner, supra note 25, at 804.
64. Caballes, 851 N.E.2d at 42 (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983)).
65. One possible exception is People v. McCauley, 645 N.E.2d 923, 933 (Ill. 1994). In that
case, the court expressly identified a prior ruling, People v. Griggs, 604 N.E.2d 257 (Ill. 1992), as
resting solely on state grounds in the spirit of Michigan v. Long.
66. People v. Brownlee, 713 N.E.2d 556, 567 (Ill. 1999) (Heiple, J., concurring).
67. Id. (citing, inter alia, Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040–41).
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discussed below, however, Illinois’s preference for a lockstep approach
is not absolute.
Fifth, Illinois is contrary to Gardner’s conclusion that state courts
rarely examine their states’ constitutional history when analyzing state
constitutional claims. On the contrary, and as discussed herein, a
review of the Illinois Constitution’s legislative history is a basic tenet of
the lockstep analysis in Illinois.68
C. Why Does Illinois Prefer a Lockstep Approach?
Illinois is generally consistent with the behavioral observations
Gardner made in his seven-state study. However, Illinois is inconsistent
with the characteristics that Gardner hypothesized would make a state
court more likely to adopt an independent constitutional analysis. If
Gardner’s factors do not influence the Illinois Supreme Court, what
conditions have caused the court to prefer a lockstep approach? This
Section discusses the possibilities and includes (1) an examination of
legal and political theories of judicial decision-making and whether they
explain the court’s approach; (2) a discussion of external factors that
may influence the court’s decision; and (3) an analysis of the court’s
major lockstep rulings.
1. Theories of the Judicial Decision-making Process
For years, political scientists, lawyers, and the legal academy have
attempted to analyze, explain, and even predict judicial decision-making
behavior. The viewpoints generally taken by the political science and
legal fields have often contradicted one another, often sharply. Indeed,
Professor Milligan notes that political scientists “assume that judges use
their office to maximize the implementation of a broad platform of
individual policy preferences,” while constitutional theorists assume
that judges, “if policy-driven at all, use their office[s] to promote only
those ‘high’ policies concerning the structure, limits, and role of
government.”69 Professor Barry Friedman similarly recognizes the
existence of a virtual wall between law professors and political
scientists.70 He explains that, in the legal academy, the scholarship is
primarily “normative” and focuses on how judges ought to decide cases,
as well as the posture they should take toward other institutions.
Political scientists, in contrast, study “positive” theory, which seeks to
68. See infra notes 138–49 and accompanying text.
69. Luke M. Milligan, Congressional End-Run: The Ignored Constraint on Judicial Review,
45 GA. L. REV. 211, 213–14 (2010).
70. Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 257–58, 267
(2005).
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understand the factors that motivate judges to rule in particular ways
and the forces that are likely to impact judges’ rulings. Commentators
like Judge Richard Posner seek a common ground or, at least, a
common understanding of these approaches. Judge Posner identifies
nine theories of judicial behavior,71 of which the attitudinal, strategic,
and legal models are most often discussed by commentators on this
subject.72
The attitudinal model contends that judicial behavior is best
explained by a judge’s ideology and policy preferences.73 This theory
rejects or minimizes the constraining effect of law on judicial decisionmaking, thus identifying judges as “freewheeling” ideologues that reach
conclusions based on their own values.74 “The attitudinal model tends
to array judges from ‘liberal’ to ‘conservative;’ political scientists use
ideological proxies—usually, judge’s political party affiliation at the
time of nomination or election—to explain and predict decisional
outcomes.”75 Most studies involving the attitudinal model have
concentrated on the behavior of United States Supreme Court Justices—
empirical research applying this model to high-court judges at the state
level is sparse.76 Two pioneers in the attitudinal field are Jeffrey Segal
and Harold Spaeth, who claim that they can predict roughly threequarters of all United States Supreme Court Justices’ votes using
71. Judge Posner’s identified bases are: (1) attitudinal; (2) strategic; (3) sociological; (4)
psychological; (5) economic; (6) organizational; (7) pragmatic; (8) phenomenological; and (9)
legalist. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 19–56 (2008).
72. Chad M. Oldfather, Judges as Humans: Interdisciplinary Research and the Problems of
Institutional Design, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 125, 132 (2007) (characterizing these three models as
the most predominate); CYNTHIA OSTBERG & MATTHEW WETSTEIN, ATTITUDINAL DECISIONMAKING IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 9–10 (2007) (drawing the same conclusion).
73. See generally LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES 7–8 (2006) (examining
attitudinal and quasi-attitudinal theories); LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES
MAKE 9–10 (1998) (opining that commentators have incorrectly focused on the attitudinal model
of judicial behavior); VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER, STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & WENDY L.
MARTINEK, JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT 30–31 (2006) (discussing the attitudinal theory);
William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, Public Opinion, the Attitudinal Model, and Supreme
Court Decision Making: A Micro-Analytic Perspective, 58 J. POL. 169, 196–97 (1996)
(explaining that the Court accounts for public opinion). For criticism of the attitudinal theory, see
Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, in 4 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 261, 263 (2006). See
also Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on
Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 257 (1995) (concluding that personal characteristics and
the political affiliation of the president appointing a judge are not meaningful predictors of
judicial decisions).
74. Helen Hershkoff & Stephen Loffredo, State Courts and Constitutional Socio-Economic
Rights: Exploring the Underutilization Thesis, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 923, 965 (2011). See also
Friedman, supra note 70, at 272 (2005) (“The central tenet of the attitudinal model is that the
primary determinant of much judicial decisionmaking is the judge’s own values.”).
75. Hershkoff & Loffredo, supra note 74, at 965–66 (internal footnotes omitted).
76. Id. at 966.
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ideological determinants.77
In contrast, the strategic theory of judicial behavior (sometimes called
the positive political theory of law) posits that “judges do not always
vote as they would if they did not have to worry about the reactions to
their votes of other judges (whether their colleagues or the judges of a
higher or a lower court), legislators, and the public.”78 In other words,
the strategic view holds (much like game theory) that judges are
strategic actors who are influenced by the choices of other actors as well
as by institutional settings.79 Strategic theorists believe that, rather than
deciding a particular case in accordance with personal beliefs or
preferences, judges act strategically to support long-term aspirations,
such as career advancement, reputation enhancement, or other goals like
a desire to avoid reversal or an attempt to influence future panels.80
Finally, the classic legal model “suggests that the path of the law can
be identified through reasoned analysis of factors internal to the law.”81
“This model [leaves] no room for any judicial individuality, much less
any expression of judicial ideology.”82 Ideology or long-term goals are
not typically relevant under the classic model, and judicial decisions
focus on legal doctrine, pure adherence to precedent, and indifference
toward policy consequences.83 Many commentators have embraced a
77. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL 229 (1993). Messrs. Segal and Spaeth updated their research in THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
78. POSNER, supra note 71, at 29.
79. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 9–18 (1998);
Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Trading Votes for Reasoning: Covering in Judicial Opinions,
81 S. CAL. L. REV. 735 (2008). “Game theory is the interdisciplinary study of human behavior
focusing on rational choices of strategies and treating different interactions between and among
individuals as if it were a game with known rules and payoffs and in which all participants are
trying to win.” Michael N. Widener, The Five-Tool Mediator: Game Theory, Baseball Practices,
and Southpaw Scouting, 12 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. J. 97, 105 n.57 (2012) (citing Roger A. McCain,
GAME THEORY: A NONTECHNICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE ANALYSIS OF STRATEGY 19 (rev. ed.
2010)).
80. See BAUM, supra note 73, at 6–7 (contending that a judge’s long-range goals impact her
decision-making); FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 94–
122 (2007) (discussing institutional influences on judicial rulings); HETTINGER ET AL., supra note
73, at 60–61; Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L.
REV. 1049, 1056 (2006) (arguing that judges are often influenced by two factors: a desire to
improve the world and a need to play the “judicial game”); POSNER, supra note 71, at 29. A state
supreme court’s decision to not include a Michigan v. Long statement in its ruling could suggest it
is unconcerned with reversal by the United States Supreme Court.
81. Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate
Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 255 (1997).
82. Id.
83. Oldfather, supra note 72, at 132; Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of
Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L.
REV. 819, 839–40; Cross, supra note 81, at 255 (“This model left no room for any judicial
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cousin of the classic legal model84 called “legal realism.” The legal
realism perspective acknowledges that judges make a good-faith effort
to follow the law, but that their view of the law is shaped by their
political, societal, and philosophical beliefs.85 Legal realists further
believe that judges are “influenced by their education, upbringing,
ambitions, experiences, and values to no less an extent than anyone
else.”86
Identifying the most appropriate and accurate model of judicial
behavior is of course subject to debate. The bulk of scholarship
regarding the attitudinal and strategic models has emanated from
political scientists, while the legal model was largely born of law
professors;87 this may explain some of the distrust that many believe
exists between the two fields.88 While recent years have seen some
movement toward a common ground, both sides have been historically
entrenched in their respective views and equally dismissive of the
other.89 Judge Posner believes that “[l]egalism drives most judicial
individuality, much less any expression of judicial ideology.”).
84. See Cross, supra note 81, at 262 (“The legal model remains ill defined, characterized by
various, often contradicting theories.”).
85. See K. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 157 (1930);
Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 809,
845–46 (1935).
86. Charles Gardner Geyh, Straddling the Fence between Truth and Pretense: The Role of
Law and Preference in Judicial Decision Making and the Future of Judicial Independence, 22
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 435, 438 (2008).
87. David Landau, The Two Discourses in Colombian Constitutional Jurisprudence: A New
Approach to Modeling Judicial Behavior in Latin America, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 687,
690–91 (2005). Landau echoes the previously-discussed tension between the two disciplines:
These legal academics have made assertions about the nature of law in a nonformalized manner and in a way that shows little concern for the intermingling of
positive and normative argument. This obvious intermingling with normative
argument has made legalistic theory an easy target for the seemingly less biased, more
purely descriptive attitudinalist and strategic models, while the failure to make any
attempts at formalizing legalist theory has left it in a muddled state, easy prey as a foil
for the other two theories, and unsupported by much of the formalized empirical
evidence that is generally considered acceptable in political science.
Id. at 697–98 (internal footnotes omitted).
88. Milligan, supra note 69, at 213.
89. See id. at 213 n.1 (“[F]or decades these two divergent orientations have talked past each
other rather than recognize the possible connections between their research agendas.” (quoting
FORREST MALTZMAN, JAMES F. SPRIGGS II & PAUL J. WAHLBECK, CRAFTING LAW ON THE
SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME 151 (2000))). See also Lee Epstein, Jack Knight &
Andrew D. Martin, The Political (Science) Context of Judging, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 783, 783
(2003) (“It has been in only the last few years that law professors have shown much interest in
political science approaches to judging . . . .”); Keith Whittington, Crossing Over: Citation of
Public Law Faculty in Law Reviews, LAW & CTS., Spring 2004, at 5, 9 (stating that political
scientists have only limited influence on the legal academy); Charles Gardner Geyh, Judicial
Politics, the Rule of Law and the Future of an Ermine Myth 1, 19 (Ind. Univ. Maurer Sch. of
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decisions, though generally they are the less important ones for the
development of legal doctrine or the impact on society.”90 Indeed,
Judge Posner suggests that many of the “isms” of decision-making
theory are often inapplicable to the work of trial judges, most of whom
lack the time and latitude to consider the long-term impact of their
decisions when most cases are routine and may be resolved through a
straightforward review of statute or precedent.91 Other observers
believe that all three theories work collaboratively, like legs under a
table:
Collectively these theories constitute three of the most prominent
accounts used in explaining judicial decision making and conflict in
US appellate courts. Although advocates of each theory might
contend that their perspective provides the best description of judicial
behaviour, we believe that each of the approaches can be perceived as
different layers of a large onion, with each school providing an added
element of explanation for how justices arrive at their final legal
outcomes.92

Can any of these models be used to suggest why the Illinois Supreme
Court would adopt a “limited lockstep” approach to the Illinois
Constitution? Regarding the attitudinal model and its ideological
considerations, one would be hard-pressed to identify a partisan divide
in Illinois’s dependent-independent debate. For example, former
Illinois Supreme Court justices aligned with the federalist approach
include Justices Clark, Goldenhersh, and Simon (elected as Democrats),
and Justices Nickels and Heiple (elected as Republicans). The bigger
lockstep advocates, such as former Justices Bilandic and Miller, were
from opposite parties. Geographical distinctions appear to be equally
nonexistent. Justices Bilandic, Simon, and Clark all hailed from Cook
County, while Justices Heiple, Miller, and Goldenhersh were from
downstate. Even at the national level, it cannot be said that the

Law-Bloomington, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 165, 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1598454 (“[A]s the twentieth century drew to a close, the
sweeping conclusions of attitudinal studies that were causing a cacophonous din in political
science circles were being greeted in the legal profession by the sound of crickets.”). But see
Friedman, supra note 73, at 262 (“[L]egal scholars now are pursuing the same sort of empirical
inquiries as positive scholars, creating exciting opportunities for true interdisciplinary
collaboration.”); Gregory C. Sisk, The Quantitative Moment and the Qualitative Opportunity:
Legal Studies of Judicial Decision Making, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 873, 876 (2008) (reviewing
Frank B. Cross, DECISIONMAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (2007)) (discussing the
“Quantitative Moment” in legal academia).
90. POSNER, supra note 71, at 8.
91. David J. Dansky, How Judges Think by Richard A. Posner, 39 COLO. LAW. 92, 93 (May
2010) (book review).
92. OSTBERG & WETSTEIN, supra note 72, at 9–10.
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divisions between judicial federalists and lockstep advocates fall strictly
along party or geographical lines. Retired Oregon Supreme Court
Justice Hans Linde is considered a major pioneer of judicial
federalism93 and built a reputation for his independent thinking,94 while
former United States Supreme Court Justice William Brennan—another
innovator95—is often regarded as being liberal-minded.96 Both men led
the charge for constitutional interpretation on a states’ rights theory—an
issue that historically is a Republican talking point.97 However,
conservative jurists, like Pennsylvania Supreme Court Chief Justice
Ralph Cappy, are also considered leaders in the judicial federalism
movement.98 Former California Supreme Court Justice Stanley Mosk
explains that state constitutionalism offers something of value to both
liberal and conservative judges:
For the liberal, there is the prospect of continued expansion of
individual rights and liberties; the work of the Warren Court can be
carried on at the state level.
For the conservative, state
constitutionalism represents the triumph of federalism; crucial
decisions about the apportionment of rights and benefits are decided
by state courts responsive to local needs, rather than by a distant
United States Supreme Court, perceived as insensitive.99

The foregoing suggests that the attitudinal model, at least as it concerns
partisan ideology, is not a helpful predictor of decision-making behavior
on this particular issue.
Katharine Goodloe’s study of the reasons state courts are more or less
likely to adopt a lockstep approach appears to comport with the strategic
model.100 She analyzed state constitutional search-and-seizure rulings
to determine whether five factors influenced the court: (1) the presence
or absence of an intermediate appellate court; (2) the age of the state’s
93. Ken Gormley, The Forgotten Supreme Court Justices, 68 ALB. L. REV. 295, 298–
303 (2005).
94. Patricia M. Wald, Hans Linde and the Elusive Art of Judging: Intellect and Craft are
Never Enough, 75 TEX. L. REV. 215, 216 (1996).
95. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (noting Brennan’s encouragement for judicial
federalism).
96. See generally Frank I. Michelman, Super Liberal: Romance, Community, and Tradition in
William J. Brennan, Jr.’s Constitutional Thought, 77 VA. L. REV. 1261 (1991).
97. See generally Paul Moreno, “So Long As Our System Shall Exist”: Myth, History, and the
New Federalism, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 711 (2005).
98. Gormley, supra note 93, at 299–300.
99. Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and Conservative, 63 TEX. L. REV.
1081, 1081 (1985).
100. Katharine Goodloe, A Study in Unaccountability: Judicial Elections and Dependent State
Constitutional Interpretations, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 749, 791–92 (2011). Ms.
Goodloe’s analysis focused on the process of judges keeping, rather than obtaining, their
judgeships.
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own constitution; (3) the prevailing political ideology of state voters; (4)
the procedure required to enact state constitutional amendments; and (5)
the degree of electoral accountability that the state’s judges have toward
voters.101 She concluded that only the fifth factor was statistically
significant in determining a state court’s approach.102 Specifically, she
identified seven variations of how judges keep their positions, with
levels of electoral accountability from highest to lowest: partisan
elections, nonpartisan elections, retention elections, reappointment by
the legislature, reappointment by the governor, reappointment by a
judicial nominating commission, and systems where judges serve for
life or until a mandatory retirement age.103 According to her research,
states with judges retained in partisan elections (i.e., judges who are
most electorally accountable) were most likely to adopt a lockstep
approach.104 States with judges retained in nonpartisan elections were
second most likely to adopt a lockstep approach.105 States with judges
retained in retention elections, like Illinois, were third most likely to
follow the lockstep doctrine.106 This relationship continued for the
remaining four methods of retention, with judges appointed for life or
until a mandatory retirement age being the least likely to embrace a
lockstep analysis.107 Ms. Goodloe theorizes that judges who are more
electorally accountable tend to gravitate toward a lockstep approach to
insulate themselves from controversy.108
It is very difficult to conclude that the Illinois Supreme Court’s
members made a conscious or even subconscious decision in Caballes
to embrace a “limited lockstep” approach based on an imminent
retention race. Two of the seven justices who ruled on Caballes did not
even seek retention. Further, at the time Caballes was decided, every

101. Id. at 769.
102. Id. at 769–73.
103. Id. at 769.
104. Id. at 770–71.
105. Id.
106. Id. Illinois Supreme Court justices are elected to ten-year terms. At the conclusion of
their term, they may run for retention on a nonpartisan ballot item that simply reads,
hypothetically, “Shall John Doe Be Retained In Office as Judge of the Supreme Court First
Judicial District?” A justice obtaining at least 60% affirmative votes is retained.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 773. Ms. Goodloe arguments are supported by a 1991 survey in which 645, or
60.5%, of responding judges expressly acknowledged the existence of political and personal
pressure in connection with issuing a decision. Id. at 772 n.132. Even the classic fictional movie,
Miracle on 34th Street, featured a judge who heeded his political advisor’s warning: “Alright,
then. Go ahead and rule there’s no Santa Claus. But, I’m warnin’ ya here, Henry. If ya do, you
couldn’t be elected dog catcher, let alone be re-elected judge!” MIRACLE ON 34TH STREET
(Twentieth Century Fox 1947).
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member of the court (with the exception of Justice Kilbride) had, or
would have at the end of their term, over twenty-year judicial careers
with fully vested pensions. As for Justice Kilbride, it is unlikely that an
imminent retention race played a role in his decision-making. For
example, despite threats that he would face an organized campaign
against his 2010 retention bid if he voted to strike down medical
malpractice caps in Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital,109 Justice
Kilbride followed his conscience and voted to strike down the caps.110
Further, no Illinois Supreme Court justice has ever lost a retention bid.
If Ms. Goodloe’s conclusion is that self-preservation is a major factor in
determining whether a judge votes to adopt a lockstep approach, Illinois
does not support her theory.
Nonetheless, some judges have not only acknowledged the existence
of political influence in their rulings, but have seemingly embraced it.
Former Illinois Supreme Court Justice James Heiple published an article
responding to many of the politics-based criticisms of state
constitutional interpretation.111 First, Justice Heiple rejected criticism
that judicial federalism is “a partisan enterprise concerned only with
expanding rights” by explaining that “such an enterprise can produce
results supported by either end of the political spectrum.”112 Justice
Heiple further rejected criticism that judicial federalism is a resultoriented political endeavor. He noted that all judicial rulings—
including those at the highest level in both state and federal courts—are
influenced in some fashion by the policy preferences of judges. Indeed,
he declared it “undeniable that, as a general rule, judges tend to render
decisions consistent with their political sympathies or affiliations.”113
In other words, Justice Heiple argues, the rulings of United States
Supreme Court Justices are likewise influenced by political ideology,
making a federal high-court ruling no more or less political than a state
high-court ruling.114 With this in mind, he contended, a state supreme
court is better suited to render a constitutional interpretation that is most
consistent with the needs and values of its citizens.115 “Thus,” he
wrote, “the political nature of constitutional interpretation is actually an
109. Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 895 (Ill. 2010).
110. Id. at 917.
111. James D. Heiple & Kraig J. Powell, Presumed Innocent: The Illegitimacy of Independent
State Constitutional Interpretation, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1507, 1510 (1998).
112. Id. See also Milwaukee Safeguard Ins. Co. v. Selcke, 688 N.E.2d 68, 73 (Ill. 1997)
(finding that statute determining tax status based on insurance company’s state of incorporation
violated the Illinois Constitution).
113. Heiple & Powell, supra note 111, at 1511.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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argument which favors state over federal constitutional
jurisprudence.”116
The Illinois approach toward this debate has been fueled by judges
with powerful personalities, some of whom have jealously guarded their
ultimate authority over state constitutional issues, while others have
adhered to textual interpretation, precedent, and cohesiveness over all
other considerations.
Despite Justice Heiple’s broad personal
assumptions, the divergent views on this topic from jurists on both sides
of the political spectrum demonstrate that “political sympathies or
affiliations” play no direct role in Illinois’s dependent-independent
debate. While some Illinois judges may share Justice Heiple’s view, the
vast majority of judges (including me) feel that political affiliations and
sympathies should not influence a judge’s decision.
My own
philosophy is similar to that of United States Supreme Court Chief
Justice John Roberts’s notion of a judge’s role being limited to that of
an umpire calling balls and strikes.117 In his confirmation hearing,
Roberts claimed that his judicial philosophy would be one of
minimalism.118
Yes, Illinois judges are people too. As individuals, we each view the
world through our own eyes, which are colored by our personal
experiences, backgrounds, and personalities. In keeping with Chief
Justice Roberts’s baseball analogy, some Illinois judges cheer for the
White Sox, some for the Cubs. Some like neither team, while others,
like me, are just content when the Chicago sports team beats the out-oftown team. Nonetheless, most of us endeavor to avoid letting these
differences, or our “political sympathies or affiliations,” threaten the
legitimacy of our limited role as “umpires.”

116. Id.
117. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55–56 (2005)
(statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States).
118. See id. at 158–59 (discussing judicial philosophy). Justice Roberts declared:
I resist the labels. I have told people, when pressed, that I prefer to be known as a
modest judge. . . . It means an appreciation that the role of the judge is limited; the
judge is to decide the cases before them; they’re not to legislate; they’re not to execute
the laws.
Another part of that humility has to do with respect for precedent that forms part of
the rule of law that the judge is obligated to apply under principles of stare decisis. . . .
. . .
. . . [A]nd to the extent they go beyond their confined limits and make policy or
execute the law, they lose their legitimacy, and I think that calls into question the
authority they will need when it’s necessary to act in the face of unconstitutional
action.
Id. at 158.
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2. Other Commonly Asserted Factors External to the Court
Gardner also examines—and rejects—some of the common theories
offered by observers regarding state courts’ apparent reluctance to
interpret their own constitution. One such theory involves law schools’
common failure to teach state constitutional law to students.119 Gardner
argues that law schools rarely offer state constitutional law courses, and
he contends that law schools typically ignore state nuances when
teaching common-law theories of contracts, torts, and property.
“Somehow law school graduates are able to work effectively . . . after a
legal education in general principles of . . . law, and [state]
constitutional law is no different,” he states.120 This argument is
questionable, however, because some Illinois law schools indeed offer
classes on the Illinois State Constitution.121 Further, while it is true that
law schools generally focus on common-law principles of contracts,
torts and property law, those areas of law are generally not codified.122
Gardner contends that the real problem is not the lack of state
constitutional training offered by schools, but rather, the lack of
guidance given by state courts.123 He further contends that attorneys
“will make the arguments they need to make to win cases. If lawyers
are not making state constitutional arguments, it is because doing so
does not help them win.”124 This conclusion is also questionable.
While the reasons are unknown, it is clear that Illinois lawyers indeed
fail to raise state constitutional issues. My five-year study of Illinois
cases identifies several cases where state constitutional arguments were
not adequately presented,125 and courts rarely raise issues that the
parties did not raise on behalf of litigants. Professor Timothy O’Neill
similarly notes that “the pernicious effect of lockstep [in Illinois] may
. . . be seen empirically.”126 He examined the history of the Illinois
Supreme Court’s search-and-seizure jurisprudence following the
119. Gardner, supra note 25, at 810.
120. Id. at 810–11.
121. For instance, Loyola University Chicago School of Law offers a course on search and
seizure law and practice in Illinois, while DePaul University College of Law and Northwestern
University School of Law offer a course titled “State Constitutional Law.”
122. An exception, of course, is contract law as it relates to the sale of goods. However, the
Uniform Commercial Code is just that—a uniform code that has no state nuance (except for the
few instances where states have declined to adopt the code in its entirety).
123. Gardner, supra note 25, at 810–11.
124. Id. at 810.
125. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (citing examples of cases where the litigants
failed to raise constitutional issues).
126. Timothy P. O’Neill, “Stop Me Before I Get Reversed Again”: The Failure of Illinois
Appellate Courts to Protect Their Criminal Decisions from United States Supreme Court Review,
36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 893, 919 (2005).
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adoption of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 and found that the first
Illinois Case to cite article I, section 6 of the Illinois Constitution was
decided on March 14, 1973.127 He further found, however, 1494 cases
citing the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution during that
same three-year period.128
Empirical data from other studies likewise suggests that litigants
commonly fail to raise state constitutional issues. Craig Emmert and
Carol Traut reviewed all state and federal constitutional challenges to
state laws addressed by state supreme courts between 1981 and 1985.129
Their research indicated that only 22% of the parties in such cases based
their claims solely on state constitutional grounds.130 They further
noted that, when analogous state and federal constitutional provisions
existed to support litigants’ claims, state constitutional challenges were
particularly unusual.131 Most claims based under state constitutional
theories did not involve civil liberties, but rather, state-specific issues
such as restrictions on special legislation and spending and debt
limitations.132 Of those litigants challenging state laws on civil liberties
grounds, over 50% relied solely on the Federal Constitution,133 while
less than 17% relied exclusively on state grounds. My analysis of
Illinois cases from 2006 through 2010 demonstrated numerous instances
where the Illinois Supreme Court expressly refused to consider an
independent state constitutional claim because the litigant failed to
adequately raise it.134 Admittedly, though, we cannot completely lay
the adoption of lockstep analysis at the feet of the bar.
Some commentators contend that state courts’ reluctance to develop a
state constitutional discourse is deeply rooted in American
jurisprudence and goes back at least to the 1930s. Indeed, throughout
much of our history, the United States Supreme Court opined that the
federal Bill of Rights constrained only the federal government.135
Claimants seeking redress for state infringements were forced to rely
upon state constitutional guarantees. However, beginning in the 1930s,
the Court began to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment as incorporating
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See generally Craig F. Emmert & Carol Ann Traut, State Supreme Courts, State
Constitutions, and Judicial Policymaking, 16 JUST. SYS. J. 37 (1992) (analyzing the findings from
the review of cases).
130. Id. at 41.
131. Id. at 42 tbl.1, 46 tbl.3.
132. Id. at 41.
133. Id. at 44 tbl.2.
134. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
135. Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1883).
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many of the protections found in the federal Bill of Rights as limitations
on state power.136 These commentators argue that “by making states
enforce federal constitutional standards, incorporation ‘obscured the
functional independence’ of state courts.”137 In other words, the
argument seems to be that lockstep constitutional analysis has been so
common for so long that it is now permanently ingrained in our culture
and jurisprudence.
3. What Does the Illinois Supreme Court Say?
No serious analysis of judicial decision-making is complete without a
thorough examination of the Illinois Supreme Court’s own statements.
This Article’s discussion of Illinois lockstep jurisprudence includes: (a)
the legislative history of the Illinois Bill of Rights because, as discussed
below, this history constitutes the most commonly stated basis for
Illinois courts to depart from lockstep analysis; (b) a review of major
Illinois Supreme Court rulings from the adoption of the 1970 Illinois
Constitution through the present, detailing the tension between court
members on both sides of this debate; and (c) an analysis of the Illinois
Supreme Court’s ruling in People v. Caballes, where the court held that
Illinois shall take a “limited lockstep” approach to this issue.
a. Legislative History of the Illinois Bill of Rights
The Illinois Bill of Rights is set forth in article I of the Illinois
Constitution. Advocates on both sides of Illinois’s dependentindependent debate, including members of the Illinois Supreme Court,
regularly and repeatedly point to the legislative history behind the
Illinois Constitution of 1970 and, in particular, comments made by the
constitutional delegates. Judicial federalists argue that these statements
demonstrate that the framers envisioned a scheme that could operate
independent of the United States Supreme Court.
For example, the Bill of Rights Committee of the Illinois
Constitutional Convention rejected four proposals that set forth
language mirroring the Federal Constitution’s Bill of Rights.138
136. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 394–406 (5th ed.
1995).
137. Gardner, supra note 25, at 806; A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts and Constitutional
Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873, 878 (1976) (questioning the extent to
which state courts were developing bodies of state constitutional law). State courts are then
required “to look to federal law in order to resolve a wide variety of constitutional issues.”
Gardner, supra note 25, at 806. “As a result, the argument goes, state courts have simply gotten
into the habit of looking to federal constitutional law for the answer to constitutional questions,
whether state or federal.” Id.
138. 6 SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, COMMITTEE ON BILL OF RIGHTS
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Moreover, in drafting an Illinois Bill of Rights, several committee
members expressly abandoned the notion of mirror-image clauses.
Indeed, Delegate Lennon, when questioned about the scope of section 2
(due process) and whether it was intended to “incorporate the recent
interpretations” of the Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution,
stated: “Well, I don’t think anybody is trying to incorporate, by
reference, anything.”139 Similarly, Delegate Foster, in discussing
section 4 (free speech rights), explained: “[T]he committee strongly
feels there is a State of Illinois. It’s the purpose of the Constitution of
Illinois to describe the shape of Illinois government, and, therefore, if
we simply relied on the Federal Bill of Rights we would end up with a
document that was grossly incomplete.”140 Likewise, Chairman Gertz,
responding to an inquiry regarding the meaning of article I, section 3
(religious freedom), stated that the committee “stood by the language of
the 1870 Constitution . . . . In Illinois, those rights have been spelled
out more fully . . . . We felt there were certain elements added by the
more expansive language in the Illinois bill of rights.”141
In particular, judicial federalists argue that the drafters appeared to
place significant emphasis on the 1970 Illinois Constitution’s privacy
and search and seizure protections, stressing that they exceeded those
first recognized by the United States Supreme Court. Commentators,
and even the Illinois Supreme Court,142 have placed considerable
weight on the comments of Committee Member Dvorak, who at one
point during the constitutional convention proceedings communicated
the proposal of the Bill of Rights Committee on Search and Seizure.143
The Bill of Rights Committee proposed breaking down section 6 into
three ideas or concepts: (1) “searches and seizures as traditionally
known,”144 (2) “eavesdropping or wiretapping or bugging,”145 and (3)
REPORT, PROPOSAL NO. 1, at 22 (1970) (religious freedom); id. at 23–25 (freedom of speech); id.
at 35–36 (bail and habeas corpus); id. at 42 (after indictment); id. at 46 (penalties after
conviction).
139. 3 SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 1501
(1970) [hereinafter 3 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS], available at http://www.idaillinois.org/cdm/
compoundobject/collection/isl2/id/3982.
140. Id. at 1403.
141. Id.
142. People v. Mitchell, 650 N.E.2d 1014, 1018 (Ill. 1995).
143. 3 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 139, at 1523–25.
144. Id.
For the purpose of explanation, section 6 as proposed by the Bill of Rights Committee,
can be broken down into three clauses or ideas or concepts, the first being that of
searches and seizures as traditionally known in the 1870 Constitution and the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Braden and Cohn, in their dissertation
on the constitution, speak of the traditional concept of the Fourth Amendment as quote,
“designed to prevent feared and hated governmental infringement on freedom.”
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“the right of privacy.”146 The committee noted that there were
interactions between all three concepts and modern constitutional
understanding must include all three in the Illinois Bill of Rights.147
Echoing Mr. Dvorak’s statements, Chairman Gertz added that the
views of the committee were consistent with public opinion.148
Id. at 1523 (statement of Mr. Dvorak).
145. Id. at 1524.
The second concept that the Bill of Rights Committee dealt with—and probably the
most important in terms of contemporary concern—is that of eavesdropping or
wiretapping or bugging or whatever the phrase is that applies to the particular instance.
We intended, by including an eavesdropping prohibition, to create a minimum
guarantee against governmental interceptions of communications. We intended also to
create a right akin to the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. So in
doing so we caused the term “un-reasonable” to be applicable to searches, seizures,
interception of their communications by eavesdropping devices, or other means.
Therefore, we inserted into this section the generic, flexible concept of an unreasonable
interception of communications to be decided on a case-by-case basis as was searches
and seizures; and we allow, we think, to provide for the flexibility of the ideological
pendulum.
Id. (statement of Mr. Dvorak).
146. Id. at 1525.
The third concept which we added into this section was that of the right of privacy,
and it reads that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and other possessions—going on with the search and seizure and interception
section—and then it says, “or invasions of their privacy shall not be violated.”
The cases that I have noted that deal with eavesdropping have pretty much intruded
into the area of privacy because now the area privacy that once was thought to be a
complete area in and of itself is the reason given for why eavesdropping, wire-tapping,
and bugging activities are unconstitutional. But there is the area of privacy still
existing in very particular instances. For instance, we have now the concept of a
general information bank whereby the state government or the federal government can
take certain pertinent information about each and every one of us based on, for
instance, our social security number—know our weight, height, family ages, various
things about us—and this is not acceptable to—was not acceptable—or the theory or
the thought of such a thing—to the majority of our committee in approving section 6.
Id. (statement of Mr. Dvorak).
147. Id.
There is an interaction of all three of these sections, and no one can stand alone as I
believe the majority of our committee sees them. The search and seizure provision on
a federal basis has been made to include violations of interceptions of communications,
thereby including, of course, the theories of eavesdropping, wire-tapping, and more
generic concepts or more futuristic things that some inventor may come up with. And
this search and seizure provision also goes to include right of privacy, so the result then
is that while the Federal Constitution has been made—or has been judicially
interpreted—to include all these concepts, we felt that we would be very progressive
and very thorough and very proper if we would include all three theories into section 6
of our bill of rights.
Id. (statement of Mr. Dvorak).
148. Id.
I would like to say only one word. We felt that while we had changed the language
slightly to add these new concepts, we were really simply abreast of public opinion.
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Delegate Foster further felt that the courts would ultimately draw the
proper balance given the technology of the time.149
The foregoing comments from the constitutional convention
delegates are important because, as discussed below, Illinois courts
view such commentary as a key consideration in whether to apply the
lockstep doctrine and such passages are regularly quoted in Illinois case
law.
b. Major Illinois Supreme Court Cases Considering the Lockstep
Doctrine Prior to Caballes
The lockstep doctrine has had a turbulent childhood in Illinois courts.
Its roots trace back at least to People v. Tillman, where the Illinois
Supreme Court held that the Illinois Constitution of 1870’s search and
seizure clause should be interpreted lockstep with its federal
counterpart.150 However, those roots fork dramatically at times. A
handful of commentators have advocated for or against the application
of the lockstep doctrine in Illinois, but those discussions occurred prior
to the Illinois Supreme Court’s examination of the doctrine in People v.
Caballes.151 Those authors largely opined—perhaps justifiably—that
Illinois courts were walking down a path toward rejecting the lockstep
doctrine.152 Justice Clark of the Illinois Supreme Court similarly
predicted that lockstep analysis was “on its last legs.”153 History would
We had gauged public opinion, we thought, through the witnesses before us and
through the literature; and it seems clear that the public wants this kind of protection.
It’s become part of search and seizure by accretion—by the passage of time.
Id. (statement of Mr. Gertz).
149. 5 SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 4277
(1970).
As to what constitutes an unreasonable invasion of privacy, certain forms of visual
surveillance, such as taking an apartment across the street and taking pictures and using
field glasses are one thing. Following a man around in a car at a distance of never
more than twenty feet is another thing. I am sure somewhere between them, the courts
would draw a line.
Id. (statement of Mr. Foster).
150. People v. Tillman, 116 N.E.2d 344 (Ill. 1953).
151. See, e.g., McAffee, supra note 55, at 1; James H. Reddy, 1996 Illinois Supreme Court
Criminal Law Opinions: Not Marching in Lockstep, 85 ILL. B.J. 270 (1997); Rick A. Swanson,
Regaining Lost Ground: Toward a Public Forum Doctrine under the Illinois Constitution, 18 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 453 (1994); Matthew S. Wilzbach, Search and Seizure and the Lockstep Doctrine—
Illinois Deviates from the Lockstep Doctrine in Telling the Police They Cannot Rely on Illinois’
Laws, 22 S. Ill. U. L.J. 181 (1997).
152. See, e.g., McAffee, supra note 55, at 3 (“[I]ncreasingly [the lockstep doctrine] has been
challenged by dissenting justices who contend that it is contrary to the state’s independent legal
tradition.”); Reddy, supra note 151, at 270 (“[T]he Illinois Supreme Court [has] made it clear that
it is not going to follow the U.S. Supreme Court in lockstep into the 21st century.”).
153. People ex rel. Daley v. Joyce, 533 N.E.2d 873, 881 (Ill. 1988) (Clark, J., concurring).
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show, however, that this was simply not the case.
On the Illinois Supreme Court, the tension between judicial
federalism and lockstep application has involved powerful
personalities—and powerful language—on both sides of the argument.
This Subsection examines the court’s more significant discussion on
this issue leading up to Caballes. However, this examination does not
focus solely on the background and holding of the cases, since the court
in Caballes already did just that. Rather, this Subsection focuses more
on the verbal tug-of-war that has existed between court members,
including some of whom may have been too quick to declare victory for
their position, and others who declared that lockstep analysis amounted
to dereliction of a judge’s oath of office.
Perhaps the first major post-1970 case to address this issue was
People v. Rolfingsmeyer.154 There, the court considered the lockstep
doctrine in the context of whether the Illinois Vehicle Code’s impliedconsent section violated the self-incrimination provisions of the Illinois
and Federal Constitutions. The court analyzed the proceedings from the
1970 constitutional convention and found no basis to conclude that the
drafters intended article I, section 10 of the Illinois Constitution to have
a broader sweep.155 Indeed, the court concluded that the “record of
proceedings reflects a general recognition and acceptance of
interpretations by the United States Supreme Court.”156 The court
further noted the following regarding the constitutional debates:
There had been proposals to alter the language of the section that were
“designed primarily to have the language of the self-incrimination
clause perhaps reflect the substance of some court decisions on this
subject,” but the bill of rights committee, speaking through Delegate
Bernard Weisberg, decided that “whichever phrasing were to be put
into . . . section 10, that the existing state of the law would remain
unchanged.”157

Accordingly, the court interpreted the Illinois provision in lockstep with
its federal counterpart.
Justice Simon concurred with the Rolfingsmeyer majority but
disagreed with its specific analysis regarding article I, section 10 of the
Illinois Constitution. First, Justice Simon explained the importance of
independent state review, stating, “As justices of the highest court of the
State of Illinois we take an oath of office to faithfully uphold the
provisions of the State Constitution. We cannot delegate that duty to
154.
155.
156.
157.

People v. Rolfingsmeyer, 461 N.E.2d 410 (Ill. 1984).
Id. at 412–13.
Id. at 412.
Id. at 412–13 (quoting 3 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 139, at 1367–77).
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anyone—not to the legislature, nor the Governor, nor to any federal
court.”158 He then criticized the majority for assuming that the rights of
the Illinois Constitution are coextensive with those of the Federal
Constitution unless the constitutional convention’s proceedings dictate a
contrary intent.159 He argued that this presumption served to invert the
proper relationship between the Illinois and Federal Constitutions, and
noted that until 1868, Illinois residents had few federal rights that were
enforceable against the state government.160 Justice Simon also took
issue with the majority’s reliance on the legislative history of the 1970
constitutional convention, contending that no evidence existed to
suggest the framers of article I, section 10 intended to limit the scope of
the self-incrimination clause so that it paralleled its federal
counterpart.161 He also quoted Delegate Elmer Gertz, Chairman of the
Bill of Rights Committee:
“We don’t have closed minds here. We are simply trying to resolve
these knotty problems; and in an area where, when you take the
specific language of the Federal Bill of Rights or our bill of rights or
any other bill of rights, the language seems to say something, and then
the cases interpret sometimes beyond the language in interpreting the
community mores and a growing sense of what constitutes justice—
what constitutes due process of law—that’s the process that’s going
on, and it isn’t going to stop with our proceedings. Unfortunately,
there are sometimes half-way times when you recognize that
something has to be done, and you are not quite sure what ought to be
done. Whenever we weren’t quite sure what ought to be done, we
refrained from doing anything.”162

Justice Simon further relied on the comments of delegate Bernard
Weisberg, who stated that the revised version of article I, section 10
would leave the existing state of the law unchanged.163 These
comments, Justice Simon believed, demonstrated that the framers did
not intend to reject further development of the law by the Illinois
Supreme Court.164
Just weeks after the Illinois Supreme Court decided Rolfingsmeyer,
the court issued its opinion in People v. Hoskins.165 Hoskins involved a
158. Id. at 413 (Simon, J., concurring).
159. Id. Justice Simon’s characterization of the majority’s opinion would ultimately frame the
test on whether to apply the lockstep doctrine. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 414–15.
162. Id. at 414 (quoting 3 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 139, at 1379) (emphasis
added by Rolfingsmeyer court).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. People v. Hoskins, 461 N.E.2d 941 (Ill. 1984).
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search and seizure issue and, again, the court rejected the notion that the
Illinois Constitution should be interpreted differently than the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.166 The court based its
conclusion on the absence of any indication from the constitutional
debates that broader protection was contemplated.167 Justice Simon
dissented, in part on the grounds set forth in Rolfingsmeyer.168
The next landmark lockstep ruling appeared in People v. Tisler.169
Tisler, decided only a few months after Hoskins, involved a probable
cause issue under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and article I, section 6 of the Illinois Constitution. The
Illinois Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s request to apply broader
protections under the Illinois provision, noting in part its previous
reliance on federal jurisprudence.170 The split decision observed the
existence of long-standing precedent that article I, section 6 be
construed lockstep with the Fourth Amendment, and to justify a
departure from federal precedent, a defendant must present a basis other
than a perceived narrowing of constitutional rights at the hands of the
United States Supreme Court. Rather, a defendant must identify “in the
language of our constitution, or in the debates and the committee reports
of the constitutional convention, something which will indicate that the
provisions of our constitution are intended to be construed differently
than are similar provisions in the Federal Constitution, after which they
are patterned.”171 Justices Clark, Goldenhersh, and Simon, however,
separately expressed their views that the Illinois courts should not be
bound to rulings of their federal counterparts.
Justice Clark, while concurring in the judgment, opined that the
majority’s position was “dangerous because it limits our power to
interpret our own State Constitution in the future.”172 He urged the
seven-member court to join what he viewed as a majority of other states
that have interpreted their state constitutions independent from the
United States Supreme Court, and warned of a “crushing degree of
uniformity” associated with lockstep interpretation.173 Justice
Goldenhersh likewise admonished that the Illinois Supreme Court is not
required to “blindly follow” the dictates of the federal courts on state

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 945.
Id.
Id. at 953 (Simon, J., dissenting).
People v. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d 147 (Ill. 1984).
Id. at 157.
Id. at 156–57
Id. at 163–64 (Clark, J., concurring).
Id. at 164–66.
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constitutional matters.174 At this point, it appeared that Justice Simon’s
position on judicial federalism, as set forth in Rolfingsmeyer, was
gaining traction in the Illinois Supreme Court.
Proponents of judicial federalism lost another round in People ex rel.
Daley v. Joyce, but likely received a boost of confidence from Justice
Clark’s concurrence in the case, where he boldly declared that the
“lockstep principle is on its last legs.”175 Joyce involved the interplay
between the state and federal guarantees to a trial by jury. The majority
acknowledged its prior ruling in Tisler, but characterized Tisler as
though it set forth a bright-line test:
If we find in the language of our constitution, or in the debates or
committee reports of the constitutional convention, an indication that a
provision of our constitution is intended to be construed differently
than similar provisions of the Federal Constitution, then this court
should not follow or be bound by the construction placed on the
Federal constitutional provision.176

In the context of a criminal defendant’s right to a trial by jury, the Joyce
court found that the language contained in the Illinois and Federal
Constitutions contained substantive differences, thus requiring the court
to give independent meaning to the Illinois Constitution’s provisions.177
Taking into consideration the common law, the court concluded that the
Illinois Constitution conferred broader jury trial protections than its
federal analogue.178
In a separate opinion, however, Justice Clark rejected the majority’s
common-law analysis as unnecessary, and noted the absence of
evidence that the drafters of the 1970 Illinois Constitution intended the
document to be interpreted by the United States Supreme Court rather
than the Illinois Supreme Court.179 He refuted the Tisler analysis as
being cumbersome, and opined that lockstep contradicts the Illinois
Supreme Court’s “long tradition of liberal construction in the service of
individual rights.”180 Justice Clark further urged the court to simply
conclude that all state constitutional provisions are to be construed
independently from their federal counterparts, and that federal
jurisprudence may be taken as persuasive rather than authoritative.181
Justice Clark observed the existence of analogous protections in the
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 166 (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting)
People ex rel. Daley v. Joyce, 533 N.E.2d 873, 881 (Ill. 1988) (Clark, J., concurring).
Id. at 875 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 875–76.
Id. at 879 (Clark, J., concurring).
Id. at 880.
Id.
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federal and state constitutions and questioned why anyone would “spill
ink uselessly” by intending parallel interpretations between the two
documents.182 He further concluded that the inclusion of these
analogous guarantees demonstrates that the drafters wished to have the
security in knowing that the Illinois Supreme Court would serve as a
second and independent layer of protection.183 He cited numerous cases
(outside the context of search and seizure) where the Illinois Supreme
Court construed the state constitution independently, and stressed that
that this “crescendo of recent cases suggests that while the majority may
pay lip service to the [lockstep] principle, it has tacitly repudiated it.”184
Next, judicial federalists saw a favorable outcome in People v.
McCauley.185 In that case, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the right
to counsel under article I, section 10 of the Illinois Constitution, as well
as the due process clause under article I, section 2,186 are broader than
analogous federal provisions. In an apparent jab at the inconsistency of
federal right-to-counsel jurisprudence, the Illinois court stated,
“Regardless of the United States Supreme Court’s current views on
waiver of the right to counsel under the Federal Constitution, the law in
Illinois remains [unchanged].”187 The Illinois court expressly refused to
“blindly follow the reasoning of a United States Supreme Court
decision at all costs,” and, instead, appeared to favor an independent
trend.188 Perhaps most interestingly, however, the McCauley court
placed the full weight of the majority behind Justice Simon’s concurring
remarks in Rolfingsmeyer:
“It is the nature of the Federal system that we, as the justices of the
Illinois Supreme Court, are sovereign in our own sphere; in construing
the State Constitution we must answer to our own consciences and
rely upon our own wisdom and insights.” ‘If we would guide by the
light of reason, we must let our minds be bold.’”189

The McCauley court abandoned federal precedent not just out of
judicial independence principles, but also in part on the strength of

182. Id. at 880–81.
183. Id. at 881.
184. Id.
185. People v. McCauley, 645 N.E.2d 923 (Ill. 1994).
186. The court noted that it “has not consistently applied the so-called lockstep doctrine as an
assist in interpreting article I, section 2, the due process clause in our State constitution. In fact,
this court has expressly asserted its independence in interpreting this particular provision of our
constitution.” Id. at 937.
187. Id. at 930.
188. Id. at 936.
189. Id. (quoting People v. Rolfingsmeyer, 461 N.E.2d 410, 415 (Ill. 1984) (Simon, J.,
concurring)).
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comments found in the 1970 Illinois constitutional debates.190 This
reliance was met, however, with harsh criticism by dissenting Justice
Miller, who viewed the majority as “laboring mightily” to recharacterize prior rulings as having been made on state grounds.191
Indeed, Justice Miller concluded that the majority’s reliance on
statements by the framers was “fundamentally flawed” and that “none
of the sources cited by the majority opinion demonstrate that the
drafters of the State constitution intended to adopt the specific rule of
law announced here.”192
In People v. Mitchell, the Illinois Supreme Court again examined the
interplay between section 6 and the Fourth Amendment.193 Mitchell
examined the issue of whether section 6 prohibited a “plain touch” patdown search for contraband.194 Relying largely on Tisler, the court
determined that section 6 confers search and seizure protections that are
“nearly parallel” to those in the Fourth Amendment.195 The court also
emphasized the comments of Committeeman Dvorak, who stated that
“there is nothing new or no new concepts that the Bill of Rights
Committee intended to provide insofar only as the search and seizure
section—or the search and seizure concept—is concerned if, in fact, we
break [section 6] down in three concepts—as I originally stated.”196
Justice Heiple joined the federalist side of the lockstep debate by
rejecting the notion that the Illinois Supreme Court is bound to follow
the United States Supreme Court on search and seizure issues. He
opined that there existed no reason for deference to the federal courts,
and that the Illinois Supreme Court’s responsibility to interpret the state
constitution is nondelegable.197
In People v. Krueger,198 the Illinois Supreme Court considered

190. Id.
191. Id. at 945 (Miller, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Bilandic likewise
concluded that the statements made at the constitutional convention upon which the majority
relied were taken out of context. Id. at 942 (Bilandic, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
192. Id. at 945 (Miller, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
193. People v. Mitchell, 650 N.E.2d 1014 (Ill. 1995).
194. Id. at 1015.
195. Id. at 1018.
196. Id. The defendant in Mitchell pointed to other comments by Mr. Dvorak, specifically
that the committee “did not intend in any way to legalize or deal with or make legally
constitutional—or constitutionally—a constitutional question, the ‘stop and frisk’ concept, for
instance.” Id. The court rejected the defendant’s position, stating that “[t]he import of Dvorak’s
statement is not entirely clear” and that it did not “negate Dvorak’s prior statement of the drafters’
intent concerning the search and seizure clause.” Id.
197. Id. at 1025 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
198. People v. Krueger, 675 N.E.2d 604 (Ill. 1996).
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whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, announced by
the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Krull,199 violated the
search and seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution. The court began
its analysis by recognizing that it “unquestionably has the authority to
interpret provisions of [the] state constitution more broadly than the
United States Supreme Court interprets similar provisions of the federal
constitution.”200 The court further acknowledged that it had “long
applied the lockstep doctrine” in Fourth Amendment cases but now
declined to do so.201 Interestingly—and as noted by Justice Miller in
dissent—the majority did not discuss any historical basis for this
departure from the lockstep doctrine.202 Rather, the majority seemed to
operate under the conclusion that Krull was simply wrongly decided
and served to bend article I, section 6 of the Illinois Constitution beyond
its breaking point.203
In People v. Washington, the court again departed from the lockstep
doctrine without relying on commentary from the constitutional
convention.204 Indeed, in this due process case, the court expressly
noted that the record of proceedings did not reveal the drafters’
intent.205 Nonetheless, the court concluded that a claim of actual
innocence is cognizable as a matter of due process under article I,

199. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
200. Krueger, 675 N.E.2d at 611.
201. Id. In People v. Caballes, the court rejected the notion that Krueger truly represents a
departure from the lockstep approach. The court stated:
We rejected that reading . . . in People v. Bolden, in which we explained that:
“We do not construe Krueger as suggesting that the search and seizure clause of
article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution must be interpreted more
expansively than the corresponding right found in the fourth amendment. The
exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy, and its history in Illinois may be
traced to this court’s decision in People v. Brocamp.”
Thus, in Krueger, we did not depart from lockstep interpretation—the challenged
statute was unconstitutional under both the state and federal constitutions. Krueger
was a case about remedies. We construed state law as providing a remedy for the
constitutional violation even though the federal constitution did not require one.
People v. Caballes, 851 N.E.2d 26, 39 (Ill. 2006) (internal citations omitted). However, also in
Caballes, the court expressly stated that Krueger constituted a “modification” of its lockstep
approach. Id. at 45. Further, in the Krueger case (and as quoted in Caballes), the court expressly
declared that it “‘knowingly depart[ed]’ from the lockstep tradition.” Id. at 39 (quoting Krueger,
675 N.E.2d at 611). See also People v. Glorioso, 924 N.E.2d 1153, 1159–60 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010)
(noting the “serious difficulty with both the soundness and the continued vitality of the court’s
statement [in Caballes] that Krueger did not depart from lockstep,” and noting two instances
where the Caballes court “treated Krueger as indeed having been a lockstep case”).
202. Krueger, 675 N.E.2d at 613 (Miller, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 612 (majority opinion).
204. People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d 1330 (Ill. 1996).
205. Id. at 1335.
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section 2 of the Illinois Constitution.206 Justice Miller, joined by Justice
Bilandic, dissented and argued that the lockstep doctrine should be
followed absent some “legitimate, objective ground for distinguishing
the language of the state constitution from that of the United States
Constitution.”207
Justice Nickels joined the federalist camp in In re P.S.,208 in which
the court found no double jeopardy violation under either the Illinois or
United States Constitution. Justice Nickels, in his dissent, urged that
the court reconsider the wisdom of the lockstep doctrine.209 He noted,
among other matters, his displeasure that the determination of whether
to follow United States Supreme Court precedent rested on similarity in
language, rather than quality of analysis.210 Justice Heiple joined
Justice Nickels’s dissent, but also wrote separately, claiming that
lockstep analysis amounts to a “dereliction of our duties as Illinois
judges.”211 The majority opinion, written by Justice Miller, addressed
this criticism directly:
The dissent apparently believes that the mere inclusion of a particular
guarantee in the state Bill of Rights, without more, demonstrates that
the provision means something different from the corresponding
provision of the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution. This
approach leads to the conclusion that similar provisions of the federal
and state constitutions mean different things, even though they are
expressed in the same terms. Under this view, the Illinois drafters did
not adopt well-established meanings when they used familiar words
and phrases but instead always meant something different. Notably,
the dissenting opinion offers no citation to the proceedings of the 1970
constitutional convention in support of this novel theory.212

In People v. Bull, the court spent little time analyzing or discussing
the lockstep doctrine and merely mentioned in passing the notion that
the court, as a general rule, “looks to the United States Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the fourth amendment” when construing the Illinois
search and seizure provision.213 What is interesting, however, is that
Justice Heiple wrote separately that he viewed the use of the lockstep
doctrine as erroneous in the wake of Krueger, which “firmly
establish[ed] the principle that article I, section 6, of the Illinois
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 1335–37.
Id. at 1341–42 (Miller, J., dissenting).
In re P.S., 676 N.E.2d 656 (Ill. 1997).
Id. at 664 (Nickels, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 662–63 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
Id. at 661–62 (majority opinion) (internal citation omitted).
People v. Bull, 705 N.E.2d 824 (Ill. 1998).
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Constitution is to be interpreted in a manner independent of the United
States Supreme Court jurisprudence.”214 Evidently, Justice Heiple’s
take on Krueger and the continuing viability of the lockstep doctrine
was contrary to that of the majority.
c. People v. Caballes
People v. Caballes is the most recent significant case regarding the
tension between the lockstep doctrine and judicial federalism.215 In
Caballes, the Illinois Supreme Court considered whether a canine sniff
during a traffic stop violated article I, section 6 of the Illinois
Constitution216 even though the United States Supreme Court deemed
this action permissible under the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.217 In a detailed analysis, the Illinois court observed
three typical scenarios when analyzing the interplay between the state
constitution and Federal Constitution: (1) provisions that are completely
unique to the state constitution; (2) provisions in the state constitution
that may be similar to a federal version, but nonetheless different in
some significant respect, requiring the provision to be given effect; and
(3) provisions in the state constitution that have similar language and
are functionally identical to an analogous federal provision.218 The
court concluded that the first scenario requires no reference to a federal
counterpart whatsoever, while the second scenario requires that the
language unique to the state constitution “be given effect.”219 The third
scenario, the court reasoned, raises the question of whether or not to
apply the lockstep doctrine.220
The Caballes court observed that, when faced with this third
scenario, state courts have generally taken one of three approaches
when construing analogous language in the federal and state
constitutions. First, some states have followed the lockstep approach
whereby the court ties its analysis to that of the United States Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the federal provision.221 According to the
Illinois Supreme Court, a true lockstep approach means that “deviation
is for all intents and purposes impossible.”222 Second, some state courts
have followed the “interstitial approach,” whereby their interpretation
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 846 (Heiple, J., concurring).
People v. Caballes, 851 N.E.2d 26 (Ill. 2006).
Id. at 26.
See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
Caballes, 851 N.E.2d at 31–32.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 31–32.
Id. at 41.
Id.
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relies on the application of criteria to determine whether “factors unique
to the state weigh in favor of departing from the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the same constitutional language.”223 The Illinois
Supreme Court referenced an explanation of this approach set forth by
the New Mexico Supreme Court as follows:
“Under the interstitial approach, the court asks first whether the right
being asserted is protected under the federal constitution. If it is, then
the state constitutional claim is not reached. If it is not, then the state
constitution is examined. A state court adopting this approach may
diverge from federal precedent for three reasons: a flawed federal
analysis, structural differences between state and federal government,
or distinctive state characteristics.”224

Under the third approach, called the “primacy” or “primary” approach,
“the state court undertakes an independent [state] constitutional
analysis, using all the tools appropriate to the task, and relying upon
federal decisional law only for guidance.”225
The Caballes court sought to reconcile its lockstep doctrine rulings
by characterizing its approach as “either the interstitial approach, or
perhaps a ‘limited lockstep’” approach.226 However, as discussed in
Part III below, the court’s meaning of “limited lockstep” is open to
interpretation and does not quite harmonize the Illinois Supreme Court’s
vast, and at times conflicting, jurisprudence on this issue.
The limited lockstep approach was ultimately adopted on principles
of stare decisis and because it reflected the court’s understanding of the
intent of the 1970 Illinois Constitution’s framers.227 Indeed, in the
context of search and seizure cases, the court has followed a lockstep
approach since at least 1963—a fact that would have been known to the
drafters of the 1970 Constitution.228 Finally, the court rejected criticism
of its approach, including arguments that lockstep analysis equates to an
abandonment of the judicial function and a surrender of state
223. Id. at 42.
224. Id. (quoting State v. Gomez, 932 P.2d 1, 4 (N.M. 1997) (internal citations omitted)). The
Caballes court also noted with approval alternative descriptions of the interstitial approach as one
where the court looks to the state constitution only if “federal constitutional law approves the
challenged state action, or is ambiguous.” Id. (quoting Gardner, supra note 25, at 774–75).
Under either formulation, the court explained, the focus of constitutional analysis is on “the ways
in which the state and federal constitutions differ.” Id. In other words, “[f]ederal constitutional
decisions are the starting point, and the party urging greater protection than federal law affords
must argue that the state and federal constitutions ‘differ in dispositive ways.’” Id. (quoting
Gardner, supra note 25, at 777–78).
225. Id. at 42 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 44–45.
228. Id. at 33.
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sovereignty.229 Applying “limited lockstep” analysis to the context of
the Illinois Constitution’s search and seizure provision, the court
concluded that the delegates and drafters of the 1970 Constitution
intended the phrase “search and seizure” to be interpreted
synonymously with the protections found in the Federal Constitution.230
III. WHERE DO THE ILLINOIS COURTS GO FROM HERE?
Having discussed the historical, philosophical, and analytical
underpinnings of Caballes, the remaining questions involve the manner
in which Caballes will be interpreted and applied in disputes going
forward, and whether Caballes will cause the Illinois Supreme Court to
reevaluate prior rulings involving the dependent-independent debate.
A. Application of the “Limited Lockstep” Doctrine
In 1985, California Supreme Court Justice Stanley Mosk wrote about
the future of judicial federalism:
Where does this leave the development of state constitutional law in
these volatile times? It is difficult to evaluate the competing trends. If
thoughtful liberals and conservatives, both of whom appear to urge
that states are appropriate protectors of individual rights, can
subordinate their traditional antipathy for each other and unite on this
one issue, it would appear that state constitutionalism may prosper.
But if the fear that use of state doctrine might thwart a conservative
trend on the Supreme Court inspires further restrictive legislative or
initiative action by political demagogues and neanderthals, then the
future of state constitutionalism is clouded.231

In his dissenting opinion in Caballes, Justice Freeman seemed to
suggest that the clouds had lifted over Illinois when he wrote that the
decision “puts to rest the confusion that has animated our application of
the ‘lockstep doctrine.’”232 But does it? After all, Justice Clark once
declared—incorrectly—that the lockstep doctrine was “on its last legs”
in Illinois.233
One could argue that Caballes is just as contradictory as the case law
it sought to reconcile. Justice Freeman’s tacit acknowledgement of
inconsistency—or at least a perception of inconsistency—in applying
the lockstep doctrine could be viewed as being contrary to the
majority’s repeated references to its “decades-long history of lockstep

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. at 45.
Id. at 45–46.
Mosk, supra note 99, at 1093.
Caballes, 851 N.E.2d at 57.
People ex rel. Daley v. Joyce, 533 N.E.2d 873, 881 (Ill. 1988) (Clark, J., concurring).
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interpretation of cognate provisions of the state and federal
constitutions,” with only “occasional” exceptions.234 Indeed, the
court’s own recitation of instances where it departed from the lockstep
doctrine seems lengthy and difficult to square with the characterization
of these instances as “occasional.” This “decades-long history of
lockstep interpretation” is similarly difficult to reconcile with the
majority’s acknowledgement that it is “an overstatement to describe our
approach as being in strict lockstep with the Supreme Court.”235
One remaining potential area for confusion relates to the meaning and
application of “limited lockstep.” The court cautioned that it “ha[d] not
unequivocally adopted the interstitial approach as it has been broadly
defined by the New Mexico court” in State v. Gomez.236 The court did,
however, expressly embrace “at the very least” a narrow version of the
interstitial view under which:
[W]e recognize several justifications for departing from strict lockstep
analysis. This approach has been described as one under which a
court will “assume the dominance of federal law and focus directly on
the gap-filling potential: of the state constitution. Under this
approach, this court will “look first to the federal constitution, and
only if federal law provides no relief turn to the state constitution to
determine whether a specific criterion—for example, unique state
history or state experience—justifies departure from federal
precedent.” To avoid confusing this court’s approach with the very
broad definition of the interstitial approach adopted by some courts,
we shall refer to it, for lack of a better term, as our “limited lockstep
approach.”237

Finally, the court observed that the criteria it has used in the past to
evaluate the state constitution’s gap-filling potential includes language
in the state constitution itself, the debates and committee reports,238 or
in the state’s values, traditions, and pre-existing law.239
The court’s attempt to carve a “limited lockstep” analysis from the
interstitial approach is interesting. For example, the court’s cautious
reference to the absence of an “unequivocal adoption” of Gomez, and
the adoption of “at least” a narrow lockstep view, might suggest that the
234. Caballes, 851 N.E.2d at 39.
235. Id. at 42.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 42–43 (quoting Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the
New Judicial Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 104 (2000)). The court stated that it
actually adopted the limited lockstep view in Tisler and “modified it in Krueger and Washington
to allow consideration of state tradition and values as reflected by long-standing state case
precedent.” Id. at 45 (internal citations omitted).
238. Id. at 43.
239. Id.
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court is open to a broader adoption of the interstitial approach in the
future. Moreover, questions may arise regarding the substantive
differences between the “limited lockstep” analysis and the interstitial
approach as defined in Gomez.240 Again, under the Gomez description,
a state court “may diverge from federal precedent for three reasons: a
flawed federal analysis, structural differences between state and federal
government, or distinctive state characteristics.”241 One could argue
that Illinois jurisprudence (including pre-Caballes cases) already fits
perfectly within this framework. For example, when analyzing identical
or analogous provisions, the most prevalent test has been whether the
report of the constitutional convention identifies an intent to deviate
from federal precedent.242 This consideration—much like Caballes’s
discussion of state values, tradition, and pre-existing state law—falls
within the “distinctive state characteristics” test discussed in Gomez.
Likewise, in some cases, the court has based its rulings not on
legislative history, but rather a basic disagreement with the United
States Supreme Court’s rationale.243 This rejection of federal precedent
is, again, consistent with the interstitial approach’s reference to a
“flawed federal analysis.”
Moreover, the interstitial approach’s
inclusion of this justification for divergence addresses critics’ claims
that deference to federal precedent constitutes an abandonment or
improper delegation of judicial duty.244
Or could it be that Caballes and its lukewarm embrace of the Gomezstyle interstitial approach signaled an intention to change course on
previously accepted bases for departing from the lockstep approach? In
other words, did Caballes’s discussion of unique state history or state
experience foreclose an independent analysis on other grounds, such as
instances where the court believes the federal precedent was wrongly

240. Id. at 42.
241. Id. (quoting Gomez v. State, 32 P.2d 1, 7 (1997)).
242. See, e.g., People v. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d 147, 157 (1984).
243. See, e.g., People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d 1330 (Ill. 1996); People v. Krueger, 675
N.E.2d 604 (Ill. 1996). In Washington, the court observed that “the Record of Proceedings does
not reveal anything as to what the drafters intended for the Illinois protection different from the
federal counterpart.” 665 N.E.2d at 1335. To be sure, the court could deem a federal decision to
be “fundamentally flawed” on the basis of unique aspects of Illinois’s values, traditions, and preexisting law. See Caballes, 851 N.E.2d at 43.
244. See, e.g., People v. Mitchell, 650 N.E.2d 1014, 1025 (1995) (Heiple, J., dissenting). See
also In re P.S., 1676 N.E.2d 656, 662–63 (Ill. 1997) (Heiple, J., dissenting) (“The Illinois Bill of
Rights [was] intended to serve as an additional protection against abuses of power by state
government, supplemental to the safeguards provided by the United States Constitution. In light
of this fact, I consider it a dereliction of our duties as Illinois judges to delegate the function of
interpreting our state constitution to the United States Supreme Court.”).
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decided?245 This conclusion seems like a bit of a leap, given that the
“unique state history or state experience” is identified as merely “an
example.”246
Nonetheless, one appellate court panel seemed to conclude that
Caballes prohibits a court from considering whether the federal court
acted erroneously, as was the case in People v. Washington and People
v. Krueger. Specifically, in People v. Fitzpatrick, the Illinois Appellate
Court, Second District, concluded that Caballes used the term “‘limited
lockstep’ for the express purpose of avoiding confusion ‘with the very
broad definition of the interstitial approach adopted by some
courts.’”247 The Fitzpatrick court further stated that the “lockstep
doctrine would be largely meaningless if Illinois courts interpreting
state constitutional provisions followed only those United States
Supreme Court decisions with which they agreed” and the “Caballes
court did not suggest that a ‘flawed federal analysis’ would ordinarily
be a valid basis for departing from United States Supreme Court
precedent.’”248
Would the Illinois Supreme Court, when interpreting a state
constitutional question, agree with the appellate court in Fitzpatrick and
deem itself obligated to follow a United States Supreme Court ruling
that the Illinois court viewed as fundamentally flawed? Washington,
Krueger, and even Caballes, suggest not.249 The Illinois Supreme
Court recently affirmed Fitzpatrick but did not expressly address the
appellate court’s rejection of a “flawed federal analysis” justification to
depart from lockstep.250 Instead, the court framed the issue as whether
departure from lockstep could be justified by “state tradition and values
as reflected by long-standing state case precedent.”251 Ultimately, the
court rejected the defendant’s argument to disregard the United States
Supreme Court’s ruling in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista252 and to
analyze the search and seizure provisions of the Illinois Constitution253
independent of the Fourth Amendment. In rebuffing the defendant’s
245. See, e.g., Washington, 665 N.E.2d at 1330; Krueger, 675 N.E.2d at 604.
246. Caballes, 851 N.E.2d at 42–43.
247. People v. Fitzpatrick, 960 N.E.2d 709, 714 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011), aff’d No. 113449, 2013
WL 1342846 (Ill. Apr. 4, 2013).
248. Id. But see Caballes, 851 N.E.2d at 43 (stating that a court can deviate from lockstep
analysis based on unique aspects of Illinois’s values, traditions, and pre-existing law).
249. See Washington, 665 N.E.2d at 1330; Krueger, 675 N.E.2d at 604; Caballes, 851 N.E.2d
at 42–43.
250. Fitzpatrick, 2013 WL 1342846.
251. Id. at *3 (citing Caballes, 851 N.E.2d at 43); id. at *2–6.
252. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
253. See ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
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argument, the court found that Fitzpatrick had simply “not provided
[the] court with an example of a long-standing state history and
tradition[] as strong as those that were identified in Krueger.”254
Reading Washington, Krueger, Caballes, and Fitzpatrick together, it is
fair to conclude that a “flawed federal analysis” may be abandoned in
favor of an independent analysis when—at a minimum—the “flaw”
runs afoul of Illinois’s tradition, values, or pre-existing law; or where
departure is supported by a unique state history or experience, or an
intent gleaned from the committee reports or the constitutional text
itself.
Perhaps the next major test in Illinois’s dependent-independent
debate will occur in the context of same-sex marriage. The United
States Supreme Court recently heard oral arguments on the question of
whether restrictions on same-sex marriage violate the Federal
Constitution.255 Concurrently, cases are pending in the Illinois Circuit
Court, Cook County, which challenge Illinois’s same-sex marriage
prohibitions exclusively on state constitutional grounds.256
Hypothetically, if the United States Supreme Court expressly finds that
the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Federal
Constitution do not protect same-sex couples hoping to marry, will
Illinois deem itself bound to follow? As discussed herein, the Illinois
Supreme Court has generally applied the lockstep doctrine on due
process and equal protection matters.257 Or will the Illinois Supreme
Court be willing to recognize enhanced due process and equal
protection rights in the same-sex marriage context? Note too, the

254. Fitzpatrick, 2013 WL 1342846, at *2–6.
255. The first case will decide whether the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits California from defining marriage as between a man and a woman.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (U.S. Dec. 7,
2012) (No. 12-144); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786
(2012) (No. 12-144), 2012 WL 3109489, at *i. The second case will decide whether section 3 of
the Defense of Marriage Act, which defines “marriage” as “only a legal union between one man
and one woman as husband and wife” for all purposes under federal law, including federal
benefits, violates the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Windsor v. United States, 699
F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom., 133 S. Ct. 786 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-307);
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari before Judgment at I, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 786
(2012) (No. 12-307) [hereinafter Windsor Petition], 2012 WL 3991414, at *I.
256. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 27–34, Darby v. Orr (Cook Cnty., Ill.,
Ch. Div. May 30, 2012) (No. 12-CH-19718) [hereinafter Darby Complaint], available at
http://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/darby_il_20120530_complaint-declaratory-injuncti
ve-relief.pdf; Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 29–36, Lazaro v. Orr
(Cook Cnty., Ill., Ch. Div. May 30, 2012) (No. 12-CH-19719) [hereinafter Lazaro Complaint],
available at http://www.aclu-il.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Lazaro-v-David-Orr-Complaint.
pdf.
257. See infra Part III.B.1.
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plaintiffs in the Illinois cases raise additional claims unique to the
Illinois Constitution, such as the right to privacy in article I, section 6,
and the prohibition against special legislation in article I, section 13.258
Yet another possibility is that the United States Supreme Court could
invalidate section 3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act on statesrights grounds, thus leaving the Illinois Supreme Court with a rather
blank slate to consider the same-sex marriage issue.259 What happens if
the Illinois Supreme Court finds that Illinois’s equal protection clause
protects same-sex marriage, and the United States Supreme Court
subsequently finds that the federal provisions does not? Would Illinois
same-sex couples be stripped of their rights under the lockstep doctrine?
B. Will Caballes Impact Previously Issued Rulings?
Caballes may potentially impact cases and rulings beyond “flawed
federal analysis” rulings, such as Washington and Krueger.260 This
Section sets forth a discussion of the more salient provisions of the
Illinois Constitution’s Article I Bill of Rights that are analogous to
provisions of the United States Constitution’s Bill of Rights.261 Some
of these provisions (almost exclusively those dealing with searches)
have been examined by reviewing courts post-Caballes, but most have
not been, and thus Caballes’s impact may remain unclear.
1. Section 2: Due Process and Equal Protection
Article I, section 2 of the Illinois Constitution262 sets forth equal
protection rights that have generally been regarded as being coextensive
with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.263 The
due process clause in article I, section 2, however, involves case law
that is somewhat inconsistent.264 In People v. Molnar, for example, the
258. See Darby Complaint, supra note 256, at 31–32 (prohibition against special legislation);
Lazaro Complaint, supra note 256, at 34–36 (right to privacy).
259. See generally Windsor Petition, supra note 255.
260. In fairness, the Caballes court did not expressly or implicitly overrule Washington or
Krueger, nor suggest that they are in danger. But see People v. Glorioso, 924 N.E.2d 1153,
1159–60 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (considering whether Caballes implicitly overruled Krueger and
answering the question in the negative). The point is that if an Illinois court, such as the appellate
court in Fitzpatrick, concludes that a state court may not reject a United States Supreme Court
ruling on matters of state constitutional law—even if the decision is perceived as being flawed—
one must question how such a view can be reconciled with Washington and Krueger.
261. For a more thorough discussion, see LOUSIN, supra note 54, at 39–75.
262. Article I, section 2 states, “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law nor be denied the equal protection of the laws.” ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
263. Nevitt v. Langfelder, 623 N.E.2d 281, 284 (Ill. 1993).
264. See LOUSIN, supra note 54, at 43 (stating that the “case law on the due process clause is
more complicated and nuanced” and that “courts apply a “markedly different” analysis in the
context of a minimum contacts analysis).
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Illinois Supreme Court stated that “while it is true that this court may
construe the Illinois due process clause independently of its federal
counterpart, and in appropriate cases will interpret the state due process
clause to provide greater protections . . . we find no compelling reason
to do so in this case.”265
2. Section 3: Religion
The case law discussing the interplay between the protections of the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section
3 (religion) of the Illinois Constitution266 also reflects a lockstep
approach.267 In Board of Education, School District No. 142, Cook
County v. Bakalis, the Illinois Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of a statute requiring the plaintiff to provide bus
transportation for nonpublic school students.268 The court examined
this issue in the context of the First Amendment as well as article I,
section 3 of the Illinois Constitution. The court noted that earlier cases,
heard under the Illinois Constitution of 1870, had interpreted the
worship provisions of the Illinois and Federal Constitutions in
lockstep,269 and the legislative reports from the 1970 constitutional
convention demonstrated an intent to maintain that course.270 In People
ex rel. Klinger v. Howlett, the Illinois Supreme Court—in another
article I, section 3 case—broadly stated that “any statute which is valid
under the [F]irst [A]mendment is also valid under the constitution of
Illinois.”271

265. People v. Molnar, 857 N.E.2d 209, 218 (Ill. 2006).
266. Article I, section 3 provides as follows:
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination, shall forever be guaranteed, and no person shall be denied any civil or
political right, privilege or capacity, on account of his religious opinions; but the
liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be construed to dispense with oaths or
affirmations, excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the
peace or safety of the State. No person shall be required to attend or support any
ministry or place of worship against his consent, nor shall any preference be given by
law to any religious denomination or mode of worship.
ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
267. For further discussion, see Michael P. Seng, Freedom of Speech, Press and Assembly,
and Freedom of Religion under the Illinois Constitution, 21 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 91, 93 (1989)
(describing the freedoms enumerated in the Illinois Constitution compared to the United States
Constitution).
268. Bd. of Educ. v. Bakalis, 299 N.E.2d 737 (Ill. 1973).
269. Id. at 744–45.
270. Id. at 744–46.
271. People ex rel. Klinger v. Howlett, 305 N.E.2d 129, 130 (Ill. 1973).
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3. Section 4: Free Speech and Press
There may be some potential for a federalist approach in the context
of article I, section 4 (speech and press) of the Illinois Constitution.272
As early as 1940, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the
“constitution of Illinois is even more far-reaching than that of the
constitution of the United States in providing that every person may
speak freely, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the
abuse of that liberty.”273 While the Illinois Constitution of 1970 was
not in existence at that time, the textual differences between that
constitution and its predecessor are fairly minor.274
In People v. DiGuida, the Illinois Appellate Court considered
whether section 4 requires state action before free speech guarantees are
triggered.275 The court further considered whether DiGuida could
satisfy the state action requirement when his alleged conduct and free
speech defense to a criminal trespassing charge involved his persistence
in circulating political petitions on private property.276 The court found
that the state action requirement had been satisfied, and further found
that the “debates connected with the adoption of the 1970 Illinois
Constitution clearly show that the delegates intended [a]rticle I,
[s]ection 4 to be independent of the Federal Constitution” and that “the
Illinois speech and press provisions could be interpreted more
expansively than their federal counterparts.”277 On further appeal, the
Illinois Supreme Court concluded that there existed a state action
requirement, but disagreed with the appellate court’s conclusion that
this requirement was satisfied and reversed on that basis.278 In doing
so, the Illinois Supreme Court acknowledged the argument of various
amici curiae urging a more inclusive interpretation of section 4, and
signaled an inclination to accept this invitation. Indeed, despite finding
that the federal and state free speech guarantees share a state action
requirement, the court stated, “[W]e reject any contention that free
speech rights under the Illinois Constitution are in all circumstances
272. Article I, section 4 provides as follows: “All persons may speak, write and publish freely,
being responsible for the abuse of that liberty. In trials for libel, both civil and criminal, the truth,
when published with good motives and for justifiable ends, shall be a sufficient defense.” ILL.
CONST. art. 1, § 4.
273. Vill. of S. Holland v. Stein, 26 N.E.2d 868, 871 (Ill. 1940).
274. See LOUSIN, supra note 54, at 45 (“[T]he earlier cases are still persuasive and may be
precedential.”).
275. People v. DiGuida, 576 N.E.2d 126 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), rev’d 604 N.E.2d 336 (Ill.
1992).
276. Id.
277. Id. at 134.
278. DiGuida, 604 N.E.2d at 345.
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limited to those afforded by the Federal Constitution . . . .”279 However,
the court never specifically identified what additional protection, if any,
the state provision provides.
City of Chicago v. Pooh Bah Enterprises, Inc. represents another case
where the Illinois Supreme Court considered whether the scope of
article I, section 4 exceeds the scope of the First Amendment.280 In that
case, the city brought a liquor license and nuisance action against a bar
that featured “expressive” nude dancing. The court began its analysis
by again acknowledging “the framers[’] recogni[tion] that the Illinois
Constitution may provide greater protection to free speech than does its
federal counterpart.”281 Nonetheless, the court declined to find that the
Illinois Constitution conveys a “greater protection to nude and seminude
dancing in establishments licensed to sell alcohol than is provided by
the federal constitution.”282
In sum, although the Illinois Supreme Court has rejected the notion
that the protections of article I, section 4 extend no further than those
afforded by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, the
court has not completely identified the full scope and scale of section
4’s reach.
4. Section 6: Searches, Seizures, Privacy, and Interceptions
Article I, section 6 sets forth marked changes from the privacy
protections of the Illinois Constitution of 1870,283 and the cases
predominately involve four major issues: the “right to privacy,”
prohibition against “unreasonable interceptions of communications,” the
“search and seizure” provisions, and the relationship between section 6
and the Fourth Amendment.284
Perhaps the most hotly contested use of the lockstep doctrine exists in
279. Id. at 344. See also Vineyard Christian Fellowship of Evanston, Inc. v. City of Evanston,
250 F. Supp. 2d 961, 979 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (holding that article I, section 4 (speech) and article I,
section 5 (assembly) of the Illinois Constitution provide broader protection than there exists under
the federal version).
280. City of Chicago v. Pooh Bah Enters., Inc., 865 N.E.2d 133, 168 (Ill. 2006).
281. Id.
282. Id. at 169.
283. Article I, section 6 provides as follows:
The people shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and other
possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or
interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other means. No
warrant shall issue without probable cause, supported by affidavit particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
284. See LOUSIN, supra note 54, at 49–52 (describing each of the four predominate issues that
arise under article I, section 6 case law).
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the context of search and seizure jurisprudence. The seminal case on
this issue is People v. Tisler.285 Tisler involved a probable cause issue
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
article I, section 6 of the Illinois Constitution. The Illinois Supreme
Court rejected the defendant’s request to apply broader protections
under the Illinois provision, noting, in part, its previous reliance on
federal jurisprudence. In People v. Fitzpatrick, the Illinois Supreme
Court reiterated that the framers of the Illinois Constitution intended
that the search and seizure provisions of article I, section 6 “have the
same scope” as the Fourth Amendment.286
Not surprisingly, criminal defendants invoking their rights against
unlawful search and seizure will likewise assert a right to privacy. In
1965, the United States Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right
to privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut.287 The framers of the Illinois
Constitution of 1970 sought to create an independent and broader
source of privacy rights than those identified in Griswold and its
progeny.288 The Illinois Supreme Court recognized this achievement in
In re May 1991 Will County Grand Jury, where the court observed that
“the Illinois Constitution goes beyond federal constitutional guarantees
by expressly recognizing a zone of personal privacy [and] [t]he
protection of that privacy is stated broadly and without restrictions.”289
That case examined the privacy interests connected to taking biometric
samples, such as hair. The court held that “a person has a reasonable
expectation that he will not be forced to submit to a close scrutiny of his
personal characteristics, unless for a valid reason.”290
Despite the broad language of In re May 1991 Will County Grand
Jury, criminal defendants failing to prevail on their search and seizure

285. People v. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d 147, 152 (Ill. 1984).
286. People v. Fitzpatrick, No. 113449, 2013 WL 1342846, at *3 (Ill. Apr. 4, 2013).
287. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). In Griswold, the Court recognized
that various constitutional guarantees create zones of privacy. For example, the First, Third,
Fourth, and Fifth Amendments identify explicit guarantees that touch on privacy interests and the
implicit language of those provisions, or “penumbras,” along with the Ninth Amendment,
guarantees basic privacy interests. Id. at 484–85.
288. See LOUSIN, supra note 54, at 49 (discussing the difference between the “right to
privacy” in the Illinois Constitution and the “privacy right” found in the United States
Constitution, noting that Illinois’s right is broader).
289. In re May 1991 Will County Grand Jury, 604 N.E.2d 929, 934 (Ill. 1992). The court has,
however, inferred restrictions on this right, stating that it is not absolute, but rather prohibits only
unreasonable invasions of privacy. Kunkel v. Walton, 689 N.E.2d 1047, 1055 (Ill. 1997).
“Reasonableness, with regard to [the] privacy clause, depends[] largely[] on the extent of one’s
expectation of privacy under the circumstances presented, as well as the degree of intrusiveness
of the invasion of privacy.” In re Lakisha M., 882 N.E.2d 570, 582 (Ill. 2008) (citation omitted).
290. In re May 1991 Will County Grand Jury, 604 N.E.2d at 935.
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arguments often do little better when asserting privacy claims. Such
was the case in People v. Mitchell, where the court likewise rejected the
defendant’s argument that the “plain touch” doctrine does not violate
the privacy protections of section 6.291 The Mitchell court also seemed
to roll back the broad language of In re May 1991 Will County Grand
Jury, stating as follows:
Apparent from the convention debates is that the drafters intended no
change in the categorization of conduct traditionally covered by the
search and seizure clause. By adding the right-to-privacy clause, the
drafters merely intended to make our constitution a more progressive
and contemporary document. We note additionally that it is not
generally held that privacy clauses are an additional source of
protection in the criminal context beyond those rights already afforded
by more specific clauses governing search and seizure.292

Justice Heiple dissented, expressing his disagreement with the
majority’s decision to follow the United States Supreme Court in
lockstep and stating that the court’s duty to interpret the Illinois
Constitution is a nondelegable duty.293 Most recently, in Caballes, the
court observed that cases in which the privacy clause has been found to
apply include those dealing with private documents or records, or a
physical invasion of the body.294 Cases not invoking the right to
privacy often include those entailing traffic stops or police investigative
techniques that did not involve the removal of physical evidence from a
person’s body.295 Moreover, in Hope Clinic for Women Ltd. v. Adams
and People v. Nesbitt, the appellate court held, post-Caballes, that the
lockstep approach does not apply to the right to privacy under the
Illinois Constitution.296
5. Section 8: Rights after Indictment
Article I, section 8 was amended by voter referendum in 1994.297
291. People v. Mitchell, 650 N.E.2d 1014, 1025 (Ill. 1995).
292. Id. at 1019.
293. Id. at 1025 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
294. People v. Caballes, 851 N.E.2d 26, 52–53 (Ill. 2006).
295. Id.
296. Hope Clinic for Women Ltd. v. Adams, 955 N.E.2d 511, 529 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011); People
v. Nesbitt, 938 N.E.2d 600, 603–05 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
297. Article I, section 8, in its current form, provides as follows:
In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation and have a
copy thereof; to be confronted with the witnesses against him or her and to have
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his or her behalf; and to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is alleged to have
been committed.
ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
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The original language contained a confrontation clause that provided,
“In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right . . . to meet
the witnesses face to face.”298 The catalyst for the change was the
Illinois General Assembly’s passage of the Child Shield Act, which
permitted a minor victim of sexual abuse to testify against an accused
via closed-circuit television.299 In People v. Fitzpatrick, the Illinois
Supreme Court found that the statute was an unconstitutional violation
of section 8’s confrontation clause.300 In reaching its conclusion, the
court rejected the State’s argument that “the essence of confrontation
under the Illinois Constitution is identical to the essence of
confrontation afforded by the [S]ixth [A]mendment of the United States
Constitution.”301 Prosecutors relied primarily on Maryland v. Craig,
which involved a similar closed-circuit testimony procedure.302 In
Craig, the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth
Amendment’s confrontation clause does not confer an absolute right to
a face-to-face meeting between the accuser and the accused, and that the
right to confrontation must sometimes yield to public policy and other
considerations.303 The Fitzpatrick court distinguished Craig on the
basis of the additional protections contained in the confrontation clause
of then-existing section 8, which “clearly, emphatically and
unambiguously require[d] a ‘face-to-face’ confrontation.”304 The court
also noted that it was not required to follow the United States Supreme

298. The constitutional amendment was proposed by the 88th General Assembly in Senate
Joint Resolution 123.
299. The Child Shield Act provided in relevant part as follows:
(a)(1) In a proceeding in the prosecution of an offense of criminal sexual assault,
aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual abuse or aggravated criminal sexual
abuse, a court may order that the testimony of a child victim under the age of 18 years
be taken outside the courtroom and shown in the courtroom by means of a closed
circuit television if:
(i) The testimony is taken during the proceeding; and
(ii) The judge determines that testimony by the child victim in the courtroom will result
in the child suffering serious emotional distress such that the child cannot reasonably
communicate or that the child will suffer severe emotional distress that is likely to
cause the child to suffer severe adverse effects.
(2) Only the prosecuting attorney, the attorney for the defendant, and the judge may
question the child.
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, ¶ 106B-1, repealed by Pub. Act 88-674, § 5 (Dec. 14, 1994).
300. People v. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d 685, 688–89 (Ill. 1994).
301. Id. at 687–88.
302. Id. at 688. See also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (holding that the
Confrontation Clause does not confer an absolute right to an in-person meeting between the
accuser and the accused).
303. Craig, 497 U.S. at 844–49.
304. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 688.
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Court in lockstep fashion, and indeed declined to do so.305
In the aftermath of Fitzpatrick, voters chose to amend section 8 to
remove its “face-to-face” guarantee. Today, testimony via closedcircuit television is permitted.306 Moreover, in People v. McClanahan,
the Illinois Supreme Court declared—apparently without an argument
offered to the contrary—that it would apply the same analysis to both
the federal and state provisions.307
6. Section 10: Self-Incrimination and Double Jeopardy
The issue of whether the right against self-incrimination set forth in
article I, section 10308 is broader than the protections of the Fifth
Amendment is well settled in Illinois. In People v. Perry, the Illinois
Supreme Court considered “whether defendant’s acceptance of the
assistance of counsel at his arraignment . . . was an invocation of his
rights under [section 10] that precluded police-initiated interrogation of
an unrelated, uncharged homicide while the defendant was in
continuous custody.”309 While the court acknowledged that it “has the
right and the obligation to interpret [the] State Constitution more
liberally than similar provisions of the Federal Constitution,”310 it
declined to do so. The court concluded that the safeguards identified by
the United States Supreme Court in McNeil v. Wisconsin made it
unnecessary to broaden the scope of section 10.311
Illinois jurisprudence on the issue of double jeopardy similarly
mirrors that of the federal courts. In In re P.S.,312 People v. Levin,313
and People v. 1988 Mercury Cougar,314 the Illinois Supreme Court
found no double jeopardy bar under the Illinois Constitution or Federal
Constitution.

305. Id.
306. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/106B-5 (2010).
307. People v. McClanahan, 729 N.E.2d 470, 473 n.1 (Ill. 2000). See also People v. Lofton,
740 N.E.2d 782, 790 (Ill. 2000).
308. Article I, section 10 provides: “No person shall be compelled in a criminal case to give
evidence against himself nor be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.” ILL. CONST. art. 1,
§ 10.
309. People v. Perry, 590 N.E.2d 454, 454 (Ill. 1992).
310. Id. at 456.
311. Id. (citing McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991)).
312. In re P.S., 676 N.E.2d 656, 661–62 (Ill. 1997).
313. People v. Levin, 623 N.E.2d 317, 327–28 (Ill. 1993).
314. People v. 1988 Mercury Cougar, 607 N.E.2d 217, 223–24 (Ill. 1992), overruled by In re
P.S., 661 N.E.2d 329, 341 (Ill. 1996), reinstated by In re P.S., 676 N.E.2d at 662.

2_ANDERSON.DOCX

1016

4/29/2013 9:29 AM

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 44

7. Section 13: Right to Trial by Jury
In the context of a criminal trial, article I, section 13315 supplements
the guarantees found in section 8. Because the Seventh Amendment’s
right to a jury trial does not apply to the states,316 section 13 provides
the sole constitutional right to a civil jury trial.317 Illinois courts
recognize a substantive difference in the right to jury trial provided
under the federal and state constitutions, and hold that Illinois provides
broader and enhanced protections.318
8. Section 22: Right to Bear Arms
Prior to 2008, the vast majority of federal reviewing courts opined
that the Second Amendment conveyed a collective, rather than
individual, right.319 At the time of the 1970 constitutional convention,
delegates were apparently mindful of the then-status of Second
Amendment jurisprudence and set out to ensure that Illinois citizens had
an individual, rather than collective, right to bear arms.320 Thirty-eight
years later, the United States Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in
District of Columbia v. Heller changed everything.321 In Heller, the
Court held that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to
keep and bear arms.322 Illinois jurisprudence in this area is still

315. Article I, section 13 provides: “The right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall
remain inviolate.” ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 13.
316. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3035 n.13 (2010) (expressly stating
that the Seventh Amendment has not been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment for
application to the states); Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996)
(“Seventh Amendment . . . governs proceedings in federal court, but not in state court.”).
317. LOUSIN, supra note 54, at 60 (“[T]he only right to a jury trial an Illinoisan has in civil
cases is that in Article I, Section 13.”).
318. People ex rel. Birkett v. Dockery, 919 N.E.2d 311, 314 (Ill. 2009).
319. See, e.g., Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 921–23 (1st Cir. 1942); United States v.
Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 1996); Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 122 (4th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976); Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185
F.3d 693, 710 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1019–20 (8th Cir. 1992);
Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1092 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384,
387 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1273–74 (11th Cir. 1997). But see
United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 260 (5th Cir. 2001) (recognizing an individual right).
320. See LOUSIN, supra note 54, at 69 (describing the intention of the delegates to grant
citizens a clear individual right to keep and bear arms, for fear that the “collective right” was
perhaps limited to militia purposes). Interestingly, however, the right conferred in section 22 is
expressly subject to the police power, and the Second Amendment has no such express
restriction. See ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 22 (“Subject only to the police power, the right of the
individual citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”).
321. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635–36 (2008). The Second Amendment
was incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct.
3020 (2010).
322. Heller, 554 U.S. at 595.
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developing.323 There is no Illinois Supreme Court case comparing the
reach of article I, section 22 with the Second Amendment postHeller.324 Some argue that the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms
may now be more liberal than the more express provisions in the Illinois
Constitution.325
CONCLUSION
For over forty years, commentators have encouraged the expansion of
individual rights through independent interpretation of state
constitutions. With some exceptions, the Illinois Supreme Court has
generally declined to accept the invitation of judicial federalism, opting
instead for a “limited lockstep” approach. The most direct method of
identifying the court’s basis for following this approach is to simply
examine the justices’ written opinions. But is there a story behind the
story? It is difficult to conclude that these rulings are a result of
Illinois’s size, age, founding history, constitutional traditions, or the
length of its constitutional text, as Gardner suggested. Nor do
Goodloe’s observations regarding self-preservation seem persuasive.
Are these opinions shaped by personal biases, experiences, or
philosophical or personal differences? In Illinois, it may be fair to say
that the Illinois Supreme Court’s lockstep approach is largely a product
of divergent judicial philosophies among the court’s jurists. Some
current and past members of the court seem primarily concerned with
federal overreaching and their duty to interpret the Illinois Constitution
rather than delegate that duty to the federal courts. Jurists on the
lockstep side appear to believe that their duty to interpret the Illinois
Constitution includes an acknowledgement that the document’s plain
text does not require a different interpretation. At this point, the issue is
largely one of stare decisis.
Had Justices Clark, Simon, and
Goldenhersh been able to sway one more member of the court in Tisler,
the landscape today could be markedly different.
Reasonable arguments appear on both sides of the dependent323. For example, in Heller, the Court cautioned “the right[s] secured by the Second
Amendment [are] not unlimited.” Id. at 626. See also McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047
(“[I]ncorporation does not imperil every law regulating firearms.”).
324. Only one major firearms case has reached the Illinois Supreme Court since Heller.
While that case involved the Second Amendment, the court did not discuss article I, section 22 of
the Illinois Constitution. See Wilson v. Cnty. of Cook, 968 N.E.2d 641, 653–55 (Ill. 2012).
325. See LOUSIN, supra note 54, at 70. See also People v. Aguilar, 944 N.E.2d 816, 828 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2011) (finding that section 22 “appears to provide less protection” than the Second
Amendment); People v. French, No. 1-11-1570, 2012 WL 6962184, at *8 (Ill. App. Ct. Nov. 2,
2012) (stating that the defendant presented no authority suggesting Illinois’s protections are
broader than the Second Amendment).
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independent debate, and this Article does not advocate for any one
approach in Illinois.
The Illinois Supreme Court made that
determination in Caballes. At this point, the Illinois Supreme Court has
characterized its preferred approach as a “limited lockstep” analysis—
that is the law and it must be followed by lower courts. While Caballes
was a 4-3 decision, the source of disagreement was not whether “limited
lockstep” was the preferred analysis, but rather, whether the facts of the
case supported a departure from the limited lockstep approach.
This Article does, however, observe that Illinois’s lockstep
jurisprudence can be confusing and difficult to reconcile. Caballes
attempted to harmonize the cases on this issue but stopped just short of
achieving that goal. Instead, the court left the door open to a broader
interpretation of the interstitial lockstep approach—one that most
cogently blends the case law on this issue. Indeed, one could argue that
the New Mexico Supreme Court’s recitation of the interstitial approach
in State v. Gomez is sufficiently broad to reconcile virtually every post1970 Illinois Supreme Court case involving the lockstep doctrine, and
would provide a bright-line test for trial courts going forward. It
remains to be seen whether the court will swing that door open, or slam
it shut. Justice Linde wrote that states “demystify constitutional law”
and that state constitutions “have little mystique.”326 Not so in Illinois,
where the mystery remains.

326. Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus—Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV.
165, 197 (1984).

